

116TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 1102

To assess and mitigate threats posed by Russian-Venezuelan cooperation,  
and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 7, 2019

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ (for herself, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Ms. SHALALA, and Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## A BILL

To assess and mitigate threats posed by Russian-Venezuelan cooperation, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Russian-Venezuelan  
5       Threat Mitigation Act”.

6       **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7       Congress finds the following:

8           (1) The Russian Federation’s increased presence  
9           in the western hemisphere is of concern to the  
10          United States and our allies in the region.

1                             (2) In December 2018, the Russian Federation  
2 sent two Tu–160 nuclear-capable bombers to Ven-  
3 ezuela for joint exercises with the Venezuelan mili-  
4 tary. The Tu–160 can carry conventional or nuclear-  
5 tipped cruise missiles with an estimated maximum  
6 range of around 3,000 miles.

7                             (3) Russian and Venezuelan forces took part in  
8 a joint 10-hour exercise across the Caribbean in De-  
9 cember 2018 with the Tu–160 nuclear-capable  
10 bombers.

11                            (4) The Maduro regime has turned to the Rus-  
12 sian Federation, one of its strongest political allies,  
13 for financial support during its current economic cri-  
14 sis.

15                            (5) Nicolas Maduro secured loans from the  
16 Russian Federation to be repaid through future oil  
17 exports, but fell behind on those payments in 2017.  
18 News reports in December 2018 suggest that Rus-  
19 sian State oil company Rosneft has lent Venezuelan  
20 state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA)  
21 \$6.5 billion partly as prepayment for crude oil, \$3.1  
22 billion of which remained outstanding as of the end  
23 of September 2018.

24                           (6) In 2016, PdVSA secured a \$1.5 billion loan  
25 from Rosneft, and PdVSA used 49.9 percent of its

1 shares in United States-based and Venezuelan-  
2 owned company CITGO as collateral. A Venezuelan  
3 default could lead to potential Russian ownership of  
4 United States energy infrastructure.

5 (7) At the conclusion of a 3-day visit to Moscow  
6 in December 2018, Maduro announced \$6 billion  
7 worth of Russian investment pledges focused on the  
8 oil and mining sectors as well as the export of  
9 600,000 tons of Russian wheat to Venezuela to  
10 cover its 2019 needs.

11 **SEC. 3. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY TO COUNTER**  
12 **RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN VENEZUELA.**

13 (a) THREAT ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 120 days  
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary  
15 of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
16 committees an assessment on Russian-Venezuelan security  
17 cooperation and the potential threat such cooperation  
18 poses to the United States and countries in the Western  
19 Hemisphere.

20 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 30 days after the  
21 submission of the threat assessment required under sub-  
22 section (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-  
23 propriate congressional committees a strategy to address  
24 Russian-Venezuelan cooperation.

1       (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
2 priate congressional committees” means the Committee on  
3 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the  
4 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

**5 SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF CITGO**

**6 ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES.**

7       (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
8 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall  
9 transmit to the appropriate congressional committees an  
10 assessment of the security risks posed by potential Rus-  
11 sian acquisition of CITGO's United States energy infra-  
12 structure holdings.

13       (b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
14 priate congressional committees” means the Committee on  
15 Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of  
16 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-  
17 eign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of  
18 the Senate.

