H. R. 3508

To impose sanctions with respect to the People's Republic of China in relation to activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 26, 2019

Mr. Gallagher (for himself and Mr. Panetta) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, Armed Services, and Transportation and Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To impose sanctions with respect to the People's Republic of China in relation to activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- 4 (a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the
- 5 "South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of
- 6 2019".

1 (b) Table of Contents for

2 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.
- Sec. 4. Policy of the United States with respect to the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
- Sec. 5. Sense of Congress with respect to the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
- Sec. 6. Sanctions with respect to Chinese persons responsible for China's activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
- Sec. 7. Determinations and report on Chinese companies active in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
- Sec. 8. Prohibition against documents portraying the South China Sea or the East China Sea as part of China.
- Sec. 9. Prohibition on facilitating certain investments in the South China Sea or the East China Sea.
- Sec. 10. Department of Justice affirmation of non-recognition of annexation.
- Sec. 11. Non-recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or the East China Sea.
- Sec. 12. Prohibition on certain assistance to countries that recognize Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or the East China Sea.

3 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

- 4 Congress makes the following findings:
- 5 (1) According to the Asia-Pacific Maritime Se-
- 6 curity Strategy issued by the Department of Defense
- 7 in August 2015, "Although the United States takes
- 8 no position on competing sovereignty claims to land
- 9 features in the region, all such claims must be based
- upon land (which in the case of islands means natu-
- 11 rally formed areas of land that are above water at
- high tide), and all maritime claims must derive from
- such land in accordance with international law.".
- 14 (2) According to the annual report of the De-
- partment of Defense to Congress on the military
- power of the People's Republic of China submitted

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in April 2016, "Throughout 2015, China continued to assert sovereignty claims over features in the East and South China Seas. In the East China Sea, China continued to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in order to challenge Japan's claim. In the South China Sea, China paused its land reclamation effort in the Spratly Islands in late 2015 after adding more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the archipelago. Although these artificial islands do not provide China with any additional territorial or maritime rights within the South China Sea, China will be able to use them as persistent civil-military bases to enhance its long-term presence in the South China Sea significantly.".

(3) On May 30, 2015, at the Shangri-la Dialogue of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that "with its actions in the South China Sea, China is out of step with both the international rules and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific's security architecture, and the regional consensus that favors diplomacy and opposes coercion".

- 1 (4) On July 24, 2015, Admiral Harry Harris, 2 Jr., noted at a forum in Colorado that each year 3 more than \$5,300,000,000,000 in global sea-based 4 trade passes through the South China Sea.
 - (5) On June 4, 2016, at the Shangri-la Dialogue, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated: "[T]he United States will stand with regional partners to uphold core principles, like freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes through legal means and in accordance with international law. As I affirmed here last year, and America's Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea have demonstrated, the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, so that everyone in the region can do the same.".
 - (6) On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration's Tribunal organized pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea issued its unanimous award in the arbitration instituted by Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China. The Tribunal noted that its award is final and binding under that Convention.
 - (7) Also according to the award, the Tribunal "concluded that, to the extent China had historical

- rights to resources in the waters of the South China
 Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they
 were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones
 provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to
 claim historic rights to resources within the sea
 areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'.''.
 - (8) Also according to the award, the Tribunal "held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.".
 - (9) Also according to the award, the Tribunal "found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands, and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had

- traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.".
 - (10) On July 12, 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China issued a statement that China "declares that the [Tribunal] award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it. . . China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by those awards. China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards."
 - (11) On July 12, 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of China issued the fifth statement in the name of that Government since 1979 that—
 - (A) stated that the People's Republic of China has sovereignty over the 4 rocks and shoals in the South China Sea;
- 24 (B) claims internal waters, territorial seas, 25 contiguous zones, one or more exclusive eco-

- nomic zones, and a continental shelf based on that sovereignty claim; and
- 3 (C) continues to claim historic rights in 4 the South China Sea.
 - (12) On July 12, 2016, Assistant Secretary of State and Department of State Spokesperson John Kirby noted that the "United States strongly supports the rule of law. We support efforts to resolve territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea peacefully, including through arbitration. . . . we urge all claimants to avoid provocative statements or actions. This decision can and should serve as a new opportunity to renew efforts to address maritime disputes peacefully.".
 - (13) On July 13, 2016, the Vice Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Liu Zhenmin, said that declaring an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea would depend on the threat China faces and stated that "[i]f our security is threatened, we of course have the right to set it up".
 - (14) On July 18, 2016, the People's Liberation Army Air Force of the People's Republic of China stated that it had conducted a "combat air patrol" over the South China Sea and that it would become

- "regular practice" in the future. A spokesperson stated that the People's Liberation Army Air Force "will firmly defend national sovereignty, security and maritime interests, safeguard regional peace and stability, and cope with various threats and challenges".
 - (15) On August 2, 2016, the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China issued a judicial interpretation that people caught illegally fishing in Chinese waters could be jailed for up to one year.
 - (16) In the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands with Related Arrangements, signed at Washington and Tokyo June 17, 1971 (23 UST 446), between the United States and Japan (commonly referred to as the "Okinawa Reversion Treaty"), the United States agreed to apply the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, with Agreed Minute and Exchanges of Notes (11 UST 1632), signed at Washington January 19, 1961, between the United States and Japan, to the area covered by the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, including the Senkaku Islands.
 - (17) In April 2014, President Barack Obama stated, "The policy of the United States is clear—

1 the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and 2 therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 3 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu-4 rity. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to un-5 dermine Japan's administration of these islands.". 6 (18) In February 2017, President Donald 7 Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 8 issued a joint statement that "affirmed that Article 9 V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 10 and Security covers the Senkaku Islands". 11 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 12 In this Act: 13 (1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAY-ABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms "account", 14 "correspondent account", and "payable-through ac-15 16 count" have the meanings given those terms in sec-17 tion 5318A of title 31, United States Code. 18 (2) ALIEN.—The term "alien" has the meaning 19 given that term in section 101(a) of the Immigration 20 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)). 21 APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-22 TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-23 mittees" means— 24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 25 the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-

| 1 | mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af- |
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| 2 | fairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence |
| 3 | of the Senate; and |
| 4 | (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the |
| 5 | Committee on Armed Services, the Committee |
| 6 | on Financial Services, and the Permanent Se- |
| 7 | lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of |
| 8 | Representatives. |
| 9 | (4) CHINESE PERSON.—The term "Chinese |
| 10 | person" means— |
| 11 | (A) an individual who is a citizen or na- |
| 12 | tional of the People's Republic of China; or |
| 13 | (B) an entity organized under the laws of |
| 14 | the People's Republic of China or otherwise |
| 15 | subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of |
| 16 | the People's Republic of China. |
| 17 | (5) Financial institution.—The term "fi- |
| 18 | nancial institution" means a financial institution |
| 19 | specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), |
| 20 | $(F),\;(G),\;(H),\;(I),\;(J),\;(K),\;(M),\;(N),\;(P),\;(R),\;(T),$ |
| 21 | (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United |
| 22 | States Code. |
| 23 | (6) Foreign financial institution.—The |
| 24 | term "foreign financial institution" has the meaning |
| 25 | given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code |

| 1 | of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar |
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| 2 | regulation or ruling). |
| 3 | (7) Knowingly.—The term "knowingly", with |
| 4 | respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, |
| 5 | means that a person has actual knowledge, or should |
| 6 | have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the |
| 7 | result. |
| 8 | (8) Person.—The term "person" means any |
| 9 | individual or entity. |
| 10 | (9) United states person.—The term |
| 11 | "United States person" means— |
| 12 | (A) a United States citizen or an alien law- |
| 13 | fully admitted for permanent residence to the |
| 14 | United States; or |
| 15 | (B) an entity organized under the laws of |
| 16 | the United States or of any jurisdiction within |
| 17 | the United States, including a foreign branch of |
| 18 | such an entity. |
| 19 | SEC. 4. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO |
| 20 | THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE EAST CHINA |
| 21 | SEA. |
| 22 | It is the policy of the United States— |
| 23 | (1) to support the principle that disputes be- |
| 24 | tween countries should be resolved peacefully con- |
| 25 | sistent with international law; |

| 1 | (2) to reaffirm its unwavering commitment and |
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| 2 | support for allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific |
| 3 | region, including longstanding United States pol- |
| 4 | icy— |
| 5 | (A) regarding Article V of the Mutual De- |
| 6 | fense Treaty, signed at Washington August 30, |
| 7 | 1951 (3 UST 3947), between the United States |
| 8 | and the Philippines; and |
| 9 | (B) that Article V of the Mutual Defense |
| 10 | Assistance Agreement, with Annexes, signed at |
| 11 | Tokyo March 8, 1954 (5 UST 661), between |
| 12 | the United States and Japan, applies to the |
| 13 | Senkaku Islands, which are administered by |
| 14 | Japan; and |
| 15 | (3) to support the principle of freedom of navi- |
| 16 | gation and overflight and to continue to use the sea |
| 17 | and airspace wherever international law allows. |
| 18 | SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE |
| 19 | SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE EAST CHINA SEA. |
| 20 | It is the sense of Congress that— |
| 21 | (1) the United States— |
| 22 | (A) opposes all claims in the maritime do- |
| 23 | mains that impinge on the rights, freedoms, |
| 24 | and lawful use of the seas that belong to all |
| 25 | countries; |

| 1 | (B) opposes unilateral actions by the gov- |
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| 2 | ernment of any country seeking to change the |
| 3 | status quo in the South China Sea through the |
| 4 | use of coercion, intimidation, or military force; |
| 5 | (C) opposes actions by the government of |
| 6 | any country to interfere in any way in the free |
| 7 | use of waters and airspace in the South China |
| 8 | Sea or East China Sea; |
| 9 | (D) opposes actions by the government of |
| 10 | any country to prevent any other country from |
| 11 | exercising its sovereign rights to the resources |
| 12 | of the exclusive economic zone and continental |
| 13 | shelf by making claims that have no support in |
| 14 | international law; and |
| 15 | (E) upholds the principle that territorial |
| 16 | and maritime claims, including with respect to |
| 17 | territorial waters or territorial seas, must be de- |
| 18 | rived from land features and otherwise comport |
| 19 | with international law; |
| 20 | (2) the People's Republic of China should not |
| 21 | continue to pursue illegitimate claims and to milita- |
| 22 | rize an area that is essential to global security; |
| 23 | (3) the United States should— |
| 24 | (A) continue and expand freedom of navi- |
| 25 | gation operations and overflights; |

| 1 | (B) reconsider the traditional policy of not |
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| 2 | taking a position on individual claims; and |
| 3 | (C) respond to provocations by the Peo- |
| 4 | ple's Republic of China with commensurate ac- |
| 5 | tions that impose costs on any attempts to un- |
| 6 | dermine security in the region; |
| 7 | (4) the Senkaku Islands are covered by Article |
| 8 | V of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with |
| 9 | Annexes, signed at Tokyo March 8, 1954 (5 UST |
| 10 | 661), between the United States and Japan; and |
| 11 | (5) the United States should firmly oppose any |
| 12 | unilateral actions by the People's Republic of China |
| 13 | that seek to undermine Japan's control of the |
| 14 | Senkaku Islands. |
| 15 | SEC. 6. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE PERSONS |
| 16 | RESPONSIBLE FOR CHINA'S ACTIVITIES IN |
| 17 | THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE EAST CHINA |
| 18 | SEA. |
| 19 | (a) Initial Imposition of Sanctions.—On and |
| 20 | after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enact- |
| 21 | ment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions |
| 22 | described in subsection (b) with respect to— |
| 23 | (1) any Chinese person that contributes to con- |
| 24 | struction or development projects, including land |
| 25 | reclamation, island-making, lighthouse construction, |

- building of base stations for mobile communications services, building of electricity and fuel supply facilities, or civil infrastructure projects, in areas of the South China Sea contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;
 - (2) any Chinese person that is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of areas of the South China Sea contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea, including through the use of vessels and aircraft to impose the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China in those areas;
 - (3) any Chinese person that engages, or attempts to engage, in an activity or transaction that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, an activity described in paragraph (1) or (2); and

(4) any person that—

- 22 (A) is owned or controlled by a person de-23 scribed in paragraph (1), (2), or (3);
- 24 (B) is acting for or on behalf of such a person; or

| 1 | (C) provides, or attempts to provide— |
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| 2 | (i) financial, material, technological, |
| 3 | or other support to a person described in |
| 4 | paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or |
| 5 | (ii) goods or services in support of an |
| 6 | activity described in paragraph (1), (2), or |
| 7 | (3). |
| 8 | (b) Sanctions Described.— |
| 9 | (1) Blocking of property.—The President |
| 10 | shall block and prohibit, in accordance with the |
| 11 | International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 |
| 12 | U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all property |
| 13 | and interests in property of any person subject to |
| 14 | subsection (a) if such property and interests in prop- |
| 15 | erty are in the United States, come within the |
| 16 | United States, or are or come within the possession |
| 17 | or control of a United States person. |
| 18 | (2) Exclusion from united states.—The |
| 19 | Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Sec- |
| 20 | retary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the |
| 21 | United States, any person subject to subsection (a) |
| 22 | that is an alien. |
| 23 | (3) Current visa revoked.—The issuing |
| 24 | consular officer, the Secretary of State, or the Sec- |
| 25 | retary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one |

of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued to any person subject to subsection (a) that is an alien, regardless of when issued. The revocation shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(c) Exceptions; Penalties.—

- (1) Inapplicability of National Emergency Requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of subsection (b)(1).
- (2) Compliance with united Nations Head-Quarters agreement.—Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall not apply if admission of an alien to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.
- (3) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates,

attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations prescribed under subsection (b)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.

(d) Additional Imposition of Sanctions.—

(1) In General.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to subsection (a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that the Government of the People's Republic of China has—

- (A) declared an air defense identification zone over any part of the South China Sea;
- (B) initiated reclamation work at another disputed location in the South China Sea, such as at Scarborough Shoal;
- 23 (C) seized control of Second Thomas 24 Shoal;

| 1 | (D) deployed surface-to-air missiles to any |
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| 2 | of the artificial islands the People's Republic of |
| 3 | China has built in the Spratly Island chain, in- |
| 4 | cluding Fiery Cross, Mischief, or Subi Reefs; |
| 5 | (E) established territorial baselines around |
| 6 | the Spratly Island chain; |
| 7 | (F) increased harassment of Philippine |
| 8 | vessels; or |
| 9 | (G) increased provocative actions against |
| 10 | the Japanese Coast Guard or Maritime Self-De- |
| 11 | fense Force or United States forces in the East |
| 12 | China Sea. |
| 13 | (2) Report.— |
| 14 | (A) IN GENERAL.—The determination of |
| 15 | the Director of National Intelligence referred to |
| 16 | in paragraph (1) shall be submitted in a report |
| 17 | to the President and the appropriate congres- |
| 18 | sional committees. |
| 19 | (B) FORM OF REPORT.—The report re- |
| 20 | quired by subparagraph (A) shall be submitted |
| 21 | in unclassified form, but may include a classi- |

fied annex.

| 1 | SEC. 7. DETERMINATIONS AND REPORT ON CHINESE COM- |
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| 2 | PANIES ACTIVE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA |
| 3 | AND THE EAST CHINA SEA. |
| 4 | (a) In General.—The Secretary of State shall sub- |
| 5 | mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report |
| 6 | that identifies each Chinese person the Secretary deter- |
| 7 | mines is engaged in the activities described in section 6(a). |
| 8 | (b) Consideration.—In preparing the report re- |
| 9 | quired under subsection (a), the Secretary shall make spe- |
| 10 | cific findings with respect to whether each of the following |
| 11 | persons is involved in the activities described in section |
| 12 | 6(a): |
| 13 | (1) CCCC Tianjin Dredging Co., Ltd. |
| 14 | (2) CCCC Dredging (Group) Company, Ltd. |
| 15 | (3) China Communications Construction Com- |
| 16 | pany (CCCC), Ltd. |
| 17 | (4) China Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec |
| 18 | Group). |
| 19 | (5) China Mobile. |
| 20 | (6) China Telecom. |
| 21 | (7) China Southern Power Grid. |
| 22 | (8) CNFC Guangzhou Harbor Engineering |
| 23 | Company. |
| 24 | (9) Zhanjiang South Project Construction Bu- |
| 25 | reau. |
| 26 | (10) Hubei Jiangtian Construction Group. |

| 1 | (11) China Harbour Engineering Company |
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| 2 | (CHEC). |
| 3 | (12) Guangdong Navigation Group (GNG) |
| 4 | Ocean Shipping. |
| 5 | (13) Shanghai Leading Energy Shipping. |
| 6 | (14) China National Offshore Oil Corporation |
| 7 | (CNOOC). |
| 8 | (15) China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL). |
| 9 | (16) China Precision Machinery Import/Export |
| 10 | Corporation (CPMIEC). |
| 11 | (17) China Aerospace Science and Industry |
| 12 | Corporation (CASIC). |
| 13 | (18) Aviation Industry Corporation of China |
| 14 | (AVIC). |
| 15 | (19) Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. |
| 16 | (20) Shaanxi Aircraft Corporation. |
| 17 | (21) China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company |
| 18 | (COSCO). |
| 19 | (22) China Southern Airlines. |
| 20 | (23) Zhan Chaoying. |
| 21 | (24) Sany Group. |
| 22 | (25) Chinese persons affiliated with any of the |
| 23 | entities specified in paragraphs (1) through (24). |
| 24 | (c) Submission and Form.— |

- 1 (1) Submission.—The report required by sub2 section (a) shall be submitted not later than 60 days
 3 after the date of the enactment of this Act and every
 4 180 days thereafter until the date that is 3 years
 5 after such date of enactment.
 - (2) FORM.—The report required by subsection
 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Secretary determines it is necessary for the national security interests of the United States to do so.
- 11 (3) Public availability.—The Secretary
 12 shall publish the unclassified part of the report re13 quired by subsection (a) on a publicly available
 14 website of the Department of State.

15 SEC. 8. PROHIBITION AGAINST DOCUMENTS PORTRAYING

- 16 THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR THE EAST CHINA
- 17 SEA AS PART OF CHINA.
- The Government Publishing Office may not publish any map, document, record, electronic resource, or other paper of the United States (other than materials relating to hearings held by committees of Congress or internal work product of a Federal agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is the position of the United States that the territory or airspace in the South China Sea contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast

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- 1 Asian Nations or the territory or airspace of areas of the
- 2 East China Sea administered by Japan or the Republic
- 3 of Korea is part of the territory or airspace of the People's
- 4 Republic of China.
- 5 SEC. 9. PROHIBITION ON FACILITATING CERTAIN INVEST-
- 6 MENTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR THE
- 7 EAST CHINA SEA.
- 8 (a) In General.—No United States person may
- 9 take any action to approve, facilitate, finance, or guar-
- 10 antee any investment, provide insurance, or underwriting
- 11 in the South China Sea or the East China Sea that in-
- 12 volves any person with respect to which sanctions are im-
- 13 posed under section 6(a).
- 14 (b) Enforcement.—The Secretary of the Treasury,
- 15 in consultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized
- 16 to take such actions, including the promulgation of such
- 17 rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out
- 18 the purposes of this section.
- 19 (c) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in sub-
- 20 sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
- 21 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall
- 22 apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, con-
- 23 spires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations pre-
- 24 scribed under this section to the same extent that such

- 1 penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act
- 2 described in subsection (a) of such section 206.
- 3 (d) Exception.—Subsection (a) shall not apply with
- 4 respect to humanitarian assistance, disaster assistance, or
- 5 emergency food assistance.
- 6 SEC. 10. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AFFIRMATION OF NON-
- 7 RECOGNITION OF ANNEXATION.
- 8 In any matter before any United States court, upon
- 9 request of the court or any party to the matter, the Attor-
- 10 ney General shall affirm the United States policy of not
- 11 recognizing the de jure or de facto sovereignty of the Peo-
- 12 ple's Republic of China over territory or airspace contested
- 13 by one or more members of the Association of Southeast
- 14 Asian Nations in the South China Sea or the territory or
- 15 airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by
- 16 Japan or the Republic of Korea.
- 17 SEC. 11. NON-RECOGNITION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY
- 18 OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR THE EAST
- 19 CHINA SEA.
- 20 (a) United States Armed Forces.—The Sec-
- 21 retary of Defense may not take any action, including any
- 22 movement of aircraft or vessels that implies recognition
- 23 of the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over
- 24 territory or airspace contested by one or more members
- 25 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the

- 1 South China Sea or the territory or airspace of areas of
- 2 the East China Sea administered by Japan or the Repub-
- 3 lic of Korea.
- 4 (b) United States Flagged Vessels.—No vessel
- 5 that is issued a certificate of documentation under chapter
- 6 121 of title 46, United States Code, may take any action
- 7 that implies recognition of the sovereignty of the People's
- 8 Republic of China over territory or airspace contested by
- 9 one or more members of the Association of Southeast
- 10 Asian Nations in the South China Sea or the territory or
- 11 airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by
- 12 Japan or the Republic of Korea.
- 13 (c) United States Aircraft.—No aircraft oper-
- 14 ated by an air carrier that holds an air carrier certificate
- 15 issued under chapter 411 of title 49, United States Code,
- 16 may take any action that implies recognition of the sov-
- 17 ereignty of the People's Republic of China over territory
- 18 or airspace contested by one or more members of the Asso-
- 19 ciation of Southeast Asian Nations in the South China Sea
- 20 or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China
- 21 Sea administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea.

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| 1 | SEC. 12. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE TO COUN- |
| 2 | TRIES THAT RECOGNIZE CHINESE SOV- |
| 3 | EREIGNTY OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR |
| 4 | THE EAST CHINA SEA. |
| 5 | (a) Prohibition.—Except as provided by subsection |
| 6 | (c) or (d), no amounts may be obligated or expended to |
| 7 | provide foreign assistance to the government of any coun- |
| 8 | try identified in a report required by subsection (b). |
| 9 | (b) Report Required.— |
| 10 | (1) In general.—Not later than 60 days after |
| 11 | the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 |
| 12 | days thereafter until the date that is 3 years after |
| 13 | such date of enactment, the Secretary of State shall |
| 14 | submit to the appropriate congressional committees |
| 15 | a report identifying each country that the Secretary |
| 16 | determines recognizes, after such date of enactment, |
| 17 | the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China |
| 18 | over territory or airspace contested by one or more |
| 19 | members of the Association of Southeast Asian Na- |
| 20 | tions in the South China Sea or the territory or air- |
| 21 | space of areas of the East China Sea administered |
| 22 | by Japan or the Republic of Korea. |
| 23 | (2) Form.—The report required by paragraph |
| 24 | (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may |

include a classified annex if the Secretary of State

- determines it is necessary for the national security interests of the United States to do so.
- 3 (3) Public availability.—The Secretary of
 4 State shall publish the unclassified part of the report
 5 required by paragraph (1) on a publicly available
 6 website of the Department of State.
- 7 (c) EXCEPTION.—This section shall not apply with 8 respect to Taiwan, humanitarian assistance, disaster as-9 sistance, emergency food assistance, or the Peace Corps.
- 10 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-11 tion of subsection (a) with respect to the government of 12 a country if the President determines that the waiver is 13 in the national interests of the United States.

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