

115TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 6534

To phase out the use of private military contractors.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 25, 2018

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY (for herself, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. GUTIÉRREZ, Ms. LEE, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. POLIS, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, Mr. RASKIN, Mr. POCAN, Ms. MOORE, Mr. PALLONE, Ms. JAYAPAL, Mr. KHANNA, and Mr. RUSH) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To phase out the use of private military contractors.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Stop Outsourcing Se-
5 curity Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The United States Government is increas-
9 ingly relying on armed private security contractors

1 to perform mission-critical and emergency essential
2 functions that historically have been performed by
3 United States military or Government personnel.

4 (2) As of March 2011, the Department of De-
5 fense had approximately 155,000 contract employees
6 operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, as compared to
7 145,000 members of the United States Armed
8 Forces operating in these two theaters of war.

9 (3) As of March 2011, the Department of De-
10 fense had deployed 9,207 armed private security
11 contractors in Iraq and 18,971 in Afghanistan, a
12 change from 10,743 and 4,111, respectively, in
13 March 2009.

14 (4) As of April 1, 2011, the Department of
15 State had over 2,500 security contractors in Iraq
16 and 1,272 in Afghanistan, under the Worldwide Per-
17 sonal Protective Services (WPPS) contract.

18 (5) In September 2009, photos were published
19 showing employees of ArmorGroup North America
20 (AGNA), hired by the Department of State to pro-
21 vide security at the United States Embassy in
22 Kabul, engaging in lewd sexual hazing and harass-
23 ment.

24 (6) Before the September 2009 incident, the
25 Department of State had issued multiple deficiency

1 notices, a cure notice, and a show-cause notice ex-
2 pressing grave concerns about the company's per-
3 formance on the contract; one State Department of-
4 ficial even wrote that the company's deficiencies "en-
5 danger performance of the contract to such a degree
6 that the security of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is
7 in jeopardy".

8 (7) On July 7, 2011, the Department of Justice
9 announced that Armor Group North America paid a
10 \$7.5 million settlement to resolve charges that the
11 company submitted false claims for payment on a
12 State Department contract; the settlement resolves
13 claims that AGNA guards violated the Trafficking
14 Victims Protection Act by visiting brothels in Kabul
15 with the knowledge of AGNA's management, as well
16 as allegations that AGNA misrepresented the prior
17 work experience of 38 third country nationals hired
18 to guard the embassy.

19 (8) A 2010 Senate Armed Services Committee
20 investigation found that EOD Technology, the com-
21 pany hired to take over protection of the Kabul Em-
22 bassy from AGNA, was suspected of hiring local
23 warlords with possible Taliban ties, and in March
24 2011 the EODT contract was terminated for de-
25 fault.

1 (9) In May 2009, four men employed as mili-
2 tary trainers for Paravant LLC, a Blackwater affil-
3 iate, fired on a civilian vehicle in Kabul, killing two
4 Afghans and wounding a third; two of the guards
5 were convicted of involuntary manslaughter in
6 March 2011.

7 (10) On September 16, 2007, individuals hired
8 by the company then known as Blackwater USA
9 opened fire on Baghdad’s Nisour Square, killing 17
10 Iraqis and wounding at least 20 others.

11 (11) In August 2010, XE Services, LLC, the
12 company formerly known as Blackwater, entered
13 into a civil settlement with the State Department,
14 under which the company agreed to pay a penalty of
15 \$42 million for 288 alleged violations of the Arms
16 Export Control Act (AECA) and the International
17 Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

18 (12) In July 2010, The Washington Post
19 quoted Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as saying
20 “‘This is a terrible confession . . . I can’t get a
21 number on how many contractors work for the Of-
22 fice of the Secretary of Defense.’”.

23 (13) On October 18, 2007, Secretary Gates
24 stated that the work of many contractors in Iraq is

1 “at cross-purposes to our larger mission in Iraq,”
2 and that “right now those missions are in conflict”.

3 (14) In 2007, the Committee on Oversight and
4 Government Reform of the House of Representatives
5 investigated Blackwater’s employment practices and
6 found that the company’s classification of its secu-
7 rity guards may have allowed the firm to avoid pay-
8 ing Social Security, Medicare, and Federal income
9 and employment taxes.

10 (15) On Christmas Eve 2006, Blackwater con-
11 tractor Andrew Moonen, while drunk, shot and killed
12 a guard to Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi
13 in the Green Zone, and though Mr. Moonen lost his
14 job with Blackwater as a result of this incident, he
15 was promptly hired by Combat Support Associates,
16 another Department of Defense contractor, and sent
17 to work in Kuwait.

18 (16) In the wake of the 2004 killing of four
19 Blackwater contractors in Fallujah, the families of
20 the men killed filed a civil suit against the company,
21 alleging that Blackwater failed to properly equip and
22 man its armored vehicles; after nearly seven years in
23 court, the case was thrown out when the families
24 could reportedly no longer pay the court costs.

1 (17) XE Services, LLC, the company formerly
2 known as Blackwater, has also faced allegations of
3 weapons smuggling and improperly licensing fire-
4 arms; in April 2010, five former Blackwater employ-
5 ees, including former president Gary Jackson and
6 former executive vice president William Wheeler
7 Mathews, Jr., were indicted on charges including
8 conspiring to violate Federal firearm laws, posses-
9 sion of unregistered firearms, and obstruction of jus-
10 tice. Jackson and Mathews later pleaded guilty to a
11 misdemeanor firearms recordkeeping violation.

12 (18) In response to a request from the Com-
13 mittee on Oversight and Government Reform of the
14 House of Representatives, the Inspector General of
15 the Small Business Administration investigated
16 Blackwater in 2008 and found that the company
17 may have misrepresented its small business status,
18 enabling it to qualify for \$110,000,000 in govern-
19 ment contracts set aside specifically for small busi-
20 nesses.

21 (19) Signed affidavits were filed in a civil law-
22 suit against Blackwater that company founder Erik
23 Prince views himself “as a Christian crusader tasked
24 with eliminating Muslims and the Islamic faith from
25 the globe”, that he knowingly deployed “demon-

1 strably unfit men” to Iraq, and that he used illegal
2 ammunition, including a bullet designed to explode
3 after entering the human body, among other
4 charges.

5 (20) In November 2007, a contractor employed
6 by DynCorp International, LLC, reportedly shot and
7 killed an unarmed taxi driver who, according to wit-
8 nesses, posed no threat to the DynCorp convoy.

9 (21) A January 2007 report by the Special In-
10 spector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that
11 DynCorp billed the United States for millions of dol-
12 lars of work that was never authorized.

13 (22) In October 2007, an audit report issued by
14 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruc-
15 tion stated that the Department of State “does not
16 know specifically what it received for most of the
17 \$1,200,000,000 in expenditures under its DynCorp
18 Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program”.

19 (23) Congress does not have complete access to
20 information about all security contracts, the number
21 of armed private security contractors working in
22 Iraq, Afghanistan, and other combat zones, the
23 number of contractors who have died, and any dis-
24 ciplinary actions taken against contract personnel or
25 companies.

1 (24) The Central Intelligence Agency paid two
2 contractor psychologists \$81 million to devise an in-
3 terrogation program that yielded very little intel-
4 ligence and may have violated United States law and
5 international human rights treaties.

6 (25) In 2016, it was reported that Erik Prince
7 was under investigation by the Department of Jus-
8 tice and other Federal agencies for attempting to
9 broker military services to foreign governments and
10 possible money laundering.

11 (26) A 2011 report by the Project On Govern-
12 ment Oversight found the government paid signifi-
13 cantly more for contractors to staff certain contin-
14 gency operation positions, including security guards
15 and language specialists.

16 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

17 In this Act:

18 (1) MISSION CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY ESSEN-
19 TIAL FUNCTIONS.—The term “mission critical or
20 emergency essential functions”—

21 (A) means—

22 (i) activities for which continued per-
23 formance is considered essential to support
24 combat systems and operational activities;

1 (ii) activities whose delay, absence, or
2 failure of performance would significantly
3 affect the broader success or failure of a
4 military operation; or

5 (iii) functions, the compromise of
6 which would degrade the system effective-
7 ness in achieving the core mission for
8 which it was designed; and

9 (B) includes—

10 (i) the provision of protective services,
11 including diplomatic security services;

12 (ii) the provision of security advice
13 and planning;

14 (iii) military and police training;

15 (iv) prison administration;

16 (v) interrogation;

17 (vi) intelligence and counterintel-
18 ligence;

19 (vii) counterterrorism; and

20 (viii) the provision of support for the
21 conduct of operations or security coopera-
22 tion.

23 (2) CONTINGENCY OPERATION.—The term
24 “contingency operation” has the meaning provided

1 by section 101(a)(13) of title 10, United States
2 Code.

3 (3) OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPER-
4 ATIONS.—The term “other significant military oper-
5 ations” means activities, other than combat oper-
6 ations, that are carried out by United States Armed
7 Forces in an uncontrolled or unpredictable high-
8 threat environment where personnel performing se-
9 curity functions may be called upon to use deadly
10 force.

11 (4) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
12 TEES.—The term “specified congressional commit-
13 tees” means the following committees:

14 (A) The Committee on Armed Services, the
15 Committee on Oversight and Government Re-
16 form, the Committee on Appropriations, the
17 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Perma-
18 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
19 House of Representatives.

20 (B) The Committee on Armed Services,
21 the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
22 ernmental Affairs, the Committee on Appro-
23 priations, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
24 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
25 Senate.

1 **SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL TO**
2 **PERFORM DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN AREAS**
3 **OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER**
4 **SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS.**

5 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
6 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall ensure that
7 all personnel working on behalf of the United States at
8 any United States diplomatic or consular mission in areas
9 of contingency operations and other significant military
10 operations are provided diplomatic security services only
11 by United States Government personnel.

12 **SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONTRACTORS PER-**
13 **FORMING MISSION CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY**
14 **ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS IN ALL AREAS OF**
15 **CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER SIG-**
16 **NIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS.**

17 (a) REPORT BY PRESIDENT.—

18 (1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than June 1,
19 2019, the President shall submit to the specified
20 congressional committees a report on the status of
21 planning for the transition away from the use of pri-
22 vate contractors for mission critical or emergency es-
23 sential functions by January 1, 2020, in all areas of
24 contingency operations and other significant military
25 operations.

1 (2) ADDITIONAL MATTERS COVERED.—If the
2 report submitted under paragraph (1) states that
3 the relevant agencies will not be able to transition to
4 government and military personnel for such func-
5 tions by January 1, 2020, the President shall in-
6 clude in the report the following:

7 (A) A statement of the reasons why the
8 relevant agencies are unable to do so, the date
9 by which they will be able to do so, and the
10 plan to ensure that they will be able to do so
11 by that date.

12 (B) A certification that—

13 (i) all contract employees have under-
14 gone background checks to ensure that
15 they do not have criminal records and have
16 not been accused of human rights abuses;

17 (ii) no contract employees are subject
18 to pending criminal charges;

19 (iii) all contract employees are under
20 the jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18,
21 United States Code (relating to military
22 extraterritorial jurisdiction);

23 (iv) contract employees, if accused of
24 crimes by the host country, must remain in
25 United States custody; and

1 (v) contracts include whistleblower
2 protections for employees to provide good
3 faith information to management, govern-
4 ment agencies, and Congress of any con-
5 tract violations, human rights abuses, or
6 criminal actions.

7 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by
8 this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified
9 form, to the maximum extent possible, but may con-
10 tain a classified annex, if necessary.

11 (b) EXAMINATION OF CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTING
12 PRACTICES.—Any individual or entity under contract with
13 the Federal Government to provide mission critical or
14 emergency essential functions after January 1, 2020, shall
15 allow the specified congressional committees to examine
16 their accounting practices with respect to any such con-
17 tract quarterly and upon request.

18 (c) REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONTRACT RE-
19 NEWALS.—Any contract with the Federal Government re-
20 quiring personnel to perform mission critical or emergency
21 essential functions that is proposed to be renewed after
22 the date of the enactment of this Act may be renewed only
23 if—

24 (1) the President reports to the specified con-
25 gressional committees that the relevant agency does

1 not have adequate personnel to perform the duties
2 stipulated in the contract; and

3 (2) the President certifies that—

4 (A) all contract employees have undergone
5 background checks to ensure that they do not
6 have criminal records and have not been ac-
7 cused of human rights abuses;

8 (B) no contract employees are subject to
9 pending criminal charges;

10 (C) all contract employees are under the
11 jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18, United
12 States Code (relating to military extraterritorial
13 jurisdiction);

14 (D) contract employees, if accused of
15 crimes by the host country, must remain in the
16 custody of the United States; and

17 (E) the contract includes whistleblower
18 protections for employees to provide good faith
19 information to management, government agen-
20 cies, and Congress of any contract violations,
21 human rights abuses, or criminal actions.

22 **SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO CONTRACTS.**

23 (a) REQUIREMENT TO ALLOW CONGRESS ACCESS TO
24 COPIES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF CERTAIN CONTRACTS AND
25 TASK ORDERS.—

1 (1) REQUIREMENT REGARDING CONTRACTS
2 AND TASK ORDERS BEFORE ENACTMENT.—The Sec-
3 retary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Sec-
4 retary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the
5 United States Agency for International Development
6 shall allow the chairman and the ranking minority
7 member of each specified congressional committee
8 access to a copy of, and a description of the work
9 performed or to be performed under, each contract,
10 and each task order issued under an existing con-
11 tract, in an amount greater than \$5,000,000 entered
12 into by the Department of Defense, the Department
13 of State, the Department of the Interior, and the
14 Agency for International Development, respectively,
15 during the period beginning on October 1, 2001, and
16 ending on the last day of the month during which
17 this Act is enacted for work to be performed in
18 areas of contingency operations and other significant
19 military operations.

20 (2) FORM OF SUBMISSIONS.—The copies and
21 descriptions required by paragraph (1) shall be sub-
22 mitted in unclassified form, to the maximum extent
23 possible, but may contain a classified annex, if nec-
24 essary.

1 (b) REPORTS ON CONTRACTS FOR WORK TO BE
2 PERFORMED IN AREAS OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
3 AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS.—The
4 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
5 of the Interior, and the Administrator of the United States
6 Agency for International Development shall each submit
7 to each specified congressional committee a report not
8 later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
9 Act that contains the following information:

10 (1) The number of persons performing work in
11 areas of contingency operations and other significant
12 military operations under contracts (and sub-
13 contracts at any tier) entered into by Department of
14 Defense, the Department of State, the Department
15 of the Interior, and the United States Agency for
16 International Development, respectively.

17 (2) The total cost of such contracts.

18 (3) The total number of persons who have been
19 wounded or killed in performing work under such
20 contracts.

21 (4) A description of the disciplinary actions
22 that have been taken against persons performing
23 work under such contracts by the contractor, the
24 United States Government, or the government of
25 any country in which the area of contingency oper-

1 ations or other significant military operations is lo-
2 cated.

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