

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1025

To provide humanitarian relief to the Venezuelan people and Venezuelan migrants, to advance a constitutional and democratic solution to Venezuela's political crisis, to address Venezuela's economic reconstruction, to combat public corruption, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 3, 2019

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. CRUZ, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. KAINE, Mr. YOUNG, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. BENNET, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. COONS, Mr. CASSIDY, and Mr. HAWLEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To provide humanitarian relief to the Venezuelan people and Venezuelan migrants, to advance a constitutional and democratic solution to Venezuela's political crisis, to address Venezuela's economic reconstruction, to combat public corruption, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

2 (a) SHORT TITLES.—This Act may be cited as the
 3 “Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and
 4 Development Act of 2019” or the “VERDAD Act of
 5 2019”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
 7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short titles; table of contents.
 Sec. 2. Defined term.

TITLE I—SUPPORT FOR THE INTERIM PRESIDENT OF VEN-
 EZUELA AND RECOGNITION OF THE VENEZUELAN NATIONAL
 ASSEMBLY

Sec. 101. Findings; sense of Congress in support of the Interim President of
 Venezuela.
 Sec. 102. Recognition of Venezuela’s democratically elected National Assembly.
 Sec. 103. Advancing a negotiated solution to Venezuela’s crisis.

TITLE II—HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR VENEZUELA

Sec. 201. Humanitarian relief for the Venezuelan people.
 Sec. 202. Humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans in neighboring countries.
 Sec. 203. Requirement for strategy to coordinate international humanitarian
 assistance.
 Sec. 204. Support for efforts at the United Nations on the humanitarian crisis
 in Venezuela.
 Sec. 205. Sanctions exceptions for humanitarian assistance.

TITLE III—ADDRESSING REGIME COHESION

Sec. 301. Classified report on declining cohesion inside the Venezuelan military
 and the Maduro regime.
 Sec. 302. Additional restrictions on visas.
 Sec. 303. Waiver for sanctioned officials that recognize the Interim President
 of Venezuela.

TITLE IV—RESTORING DEMOCRACY AND ADDRESSING THE
 POLITICAL CRISIS IN VENEZUELA

Sec. 401. Special Envoy for Venezuela and Task Force on Venezuela.
 Sec. 402. Support for the Lima Group.
 Sec. 403. Accountability for crimes against humanity.
 Sec. 404. Upholding the Organization of American States Inter-American
 Democratic Charter.
 Sec. 405. Support for international election observation and democratic civil so-
 ciety.

TITLE V—SUPPORTING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF VENEZUELA

- Sec. 501. Engaging international financial institutions to advance the reconstruction of Venezuela’s economy and energy infrastructure.
- Sec. 502. Recovering assets stolen from the Venezuelan people.

TITLE VI—RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN VENEZUELA

- Sec. 601. Developing and implementing a coordinated sanctions strategy with partners in the Western Hemisphere and the European Union.
- Sec. 602. Classified briefing on the involvement of Venezuelan officials in corruption and illicit narcotics trafficking.
- Sec. 603. Sanctions on persons responsible for public corruption and undermining democratic governance.
- Sec. 604. Public information about sanctioned officials.
- Sec. 605. Financial sanctions on Maduro regime debt.
- Sec. 606. Additional financial sanctions on Maduro regime debt.
- Sec. 607. Expanding kingpin sanctions on narcotics trafficking and money laundering.
- Sec. 608. Sanctions on the Maduro regime’s trade in gold.
- Sec. 609. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft.
- Sec. 610. Classified briefing on activities of certain foreign governments and actors in Venezuela.

TITLE VII—CRYPTOCURRENCY SANCTIONS AND ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED STATES SANCTIONS

- Sec. 701. Sanctions on Venezuela’s cryptocurrency and the provision of related technologies.
- Sec. 702. Report on the impact of cryptocurrencies on United States sanctions.

TITLE VIII—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

- Sec. 801. Congressional briefings.
- Sec. 802. Extension and termination of sanctions against Venezuela.

1 SEC. 2. DEFINED TERM.

2 In this Act, the term “Maduro regime” means any
 3 ministry, agency, political subdivision, or instrumentality
 4 of the Government of Venezuela, including the Central
 5 Bank of Venezuela and Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., any
 6 branch of the Venezuelan armed forces, and any person
 7 owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the
 8 Government of Venezuela that remain under the control
 9 of Nicolás Maduro or the subsequent control of a person
 10 that comes to power through any means other than—

1 (1) a free, fair, and transparent democratic
2 election that is monitored by credible international
3 observers; or

4 (2) the appointment by Venezuela’s democrat-
5 ically elected National Assembly of an Interim Presi-
6 dent with a mandate to convene elections described
7 in paragraph (1); and

8 (3) a negotiation process described in section
9 103.

10 **TITLE I—SUPPORT FOR THE IN-**
11 **TERIM PRESIDENT OF VEN-**
12 **EZUELA AND RECOGNITION**
13 **OF THE VENEZUELAN NA-**
14 **TIONAL ASSEMBLY**

15 **SEC. 101. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF**
16 **THE INTERIM PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA.**

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
18 ings:

19 (1) Venezuela’s electoral event on May 20,
20 2018, was characterized by widespread fraud and
21 did not comply with international standards for a
22 free, fair, and transparent electoral process.

23 (2) Given the fraudulent nature of Venezuela’s
24 May 20, 2018, electoral event, Nicolás Maduro’s ten-

1 ure as President of Venezuela ended on January 10,
2 2019.

3 (3) The National Assembly of Venezuela ap-
4 proved a resolution on January 15, 2019, that ter-
5 minated Nicolás Maduro’s authority as the President
6 of Venezuela.

7 (4) On January 23, 2019, the President of the
8 National Assembly of Venezuela was sworn in as the
9 Interim President of Venezuela.

10 (5) The United States Government, the Govern-
11 ments of Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
12 Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Can-
13 ada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus,
14 Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ec-
15 uador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
16 Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland,
17 Israel, Japan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
18 bourg, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Mo-
19 rocco, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Po-
20 land, Portugal, Romania, South Korea, Spain, Swe-
21 den, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom,
22 the Secretary General of the Organization of Amer-
23 ican States, and the European Parliament have all
24 recognized National Assembly President Juan
25 Guaidó as the Interim President of Venezuela.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress—

3 (1) to support the decisions by the United
4 States Government, more than 50 governments
5 around the world, the Secretary General of the Or-
6 ganization of American States, and the European
7 Parliament to recognize National Assembly Presi-
8 dent Juan Guaidó as the Interim President of Ven-
9 ezuela;

10 (2) to encourage the Interim President of Ven-
11 ezuela to advance efforts to hold democratic presi-
12 dential elections in the shortest possible period; and

13 (3) that the Organization of American States,
14 with support from the United States Government
15 and partner governments, should provide diplomatic,
16 technical, and financial support for a new presi-
17 dential election in Venezuela that complies with
18 international standards for a free, fair, and trans-
19 parent electoral processes.

20 **SEC. 102. RECOGNITION OF VENEZUELA'S DEMOCRAT-**
21 **ICALLY ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.**

22 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Venezuela's uni-
23 cameral National Assembly convened on January 6, 2016,
24 following democratic elections that were held on December
25 6, 2015.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that—

3 (1) Venezuela’s democratically elected National
4 Assembly is the only national level democratic insti-
5 tution remaining in the country; and

6 (2) actions taken by the Maduro regime that re-
7 quire legislative approval, ratification, or concur-
8 rence, including the provision or refinancing of
9 debts, should only be recognized as legitimate by the
10 United States and the international community if
11 such legislative actions are authorized by the demo-
12 cratically elected National Assembly of the
13 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

14 (c) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
15 recognize the democratically elected National Assembly of
16 Venezuela as the only legitimate national legislative body
17 in Venezuela.

18 (d) ASSISTANCE TO VENEZUELA’S NATIONAL ASSEM-
19 BLY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
20 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
21 national Development, shall prioritize efforts to provide
22 technical assistance to support the democratically elected
23 National Assembly of Venezuela in accordance with sec-
24 tion 406.

1 **SEC. 103. ADVANCING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO VEN-**
2 **EZUELA’S CRISIS.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) direct, credible negotiations led by the In-
6 terim President of Venezuela and members of Ven-
7 ezuela’s democratically elected National Assembly—

8 (A) are supported by stakeholders in the
9 international community that have recognized
10 the Interim President of Venezuela;

11 (B) include the input and interests of Ven-
12 ezuelan civil society; and

13 (C) represent the best opportunity to reach
14 a solution to the Venezuelan crisis that in-
15 cludes—

16 (i) holding a new presidential election
17 that complies with international standards
18 for a free, fair, and transparent electoral
19 process;

20 (ii) ending Nicolás Maduro’s usurpa-
21 tion of presidential authorities;

22 (iii) restoring democracy and the rule
23 of law;

24 (iv) freeing political prisoners; and

25 (v) facilitating the delivery of humani-
26 tarian aid;

1 (2) dialogue between the Maduro regime and
2 political opposition that commenced in October
3 2017, and were supported by the Governments of
4 Mexico, of Chile, of Bolivia, and of Nicaragua, did
5 not result in an agreement because the Maduro re-
6 gime failed to credibly participate in the process;
7 and

8 (3) negotiations between the Maduro regime
9 and political opposition that commenced in October
10 2016, and were supported by the Vatican, did not
11 result in an agreement because the Maduro regime
12 failed to credibly participate in the process.

13 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
14 support diplomatic engagement in order to advance a ne-
15 gotiated and peaceful solution to Venezuela’s political, eco-
16 nomic, and humanitarian crisis that is described in sub-
17 section (a)(1).

18 **TITLE II—HUMANITARIAN**

19 **RELIEF FOR VENEZUELA**

20 **SEC. 201. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE VENEZUELAN** 21 **PEOPLE.**

22 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
23 gress that—

1 (1) the United States Government should ex-
2 pand efforts to peacefully address Venezuela’s hu-
3 manitarian crisis; and

4 (2) humanitarian assistance—

5 (A) should be provided directly to the peo-
6 ple of Venezuela; and

7 (B) should not be passed through the con-
8 trol or distribution mechanisms of the Maduro
9 regime.

10 (b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
11 nation with the Administrator of the United States Agen-
12 cy for International Development, shall work through
13 international and nongovernmental organizations to pro-
14 vide humanitarian assistance to individuals and commu-
15 nities in Venezuela, including—

16 (1) public health commodities to Venezuelan
17 health facilities and services, including medicines on
18 the World Health Organization’s Model List of Es-
19 sential Medicines and basic medical supplies and
20 equipment;

21 (2) the basic food commodities and nutritional
22 supplements needed to address growing malnutrition
23 and improve food security for the people of Ven-
24 ezuela, with a specific emphasis on the most vulner-
25 able populations; and

1 (3) technical assistance to ensure that health
2 and food commodities are appropriately selected,
3 procured, and distributed.

4 (c) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
7 retary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
8 trator of the United States Agency for International
9 Development shall submit a strategy for carrying out
10 the activities described in subsection (b) to—

11 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
12 the Senate;

13 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
14 the Senate;

15 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
16 the House of Representatives; and

17 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
18 the House of Representatives.

19 (2) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy re-
20 quired under paragraph (1) shall be based on inde-
21 pendent assessments of the humanitarian crisis in
22 Venezuela, including assessments by nongovern-
23 mental organizations and the United Nations hu-
24 manitarian agencies listed in section 204(a).

25 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
2 appropriated to the Secretary of State \$200,000,000
3 for fiscal year 2019 to carry out the activities set
4 forth in subsection (b) in accordance with this sec-
5 tion.

6 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

7 (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided
8 under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated
9 or otherwise made available pursuant to para-
10 graph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days
11 after the date on which the President provides
12 notice to the committees listed in subsection
13 (c)(1) of the intent to obligate such funds.

14 (B) WAIVER.—

15 (i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of
16 State may waive the requirement under
17 subparagraph (A) if the Secretary of State
18 determines that such requirement would
19 pose a substantial risk to human health or
20 welfare.

21 (ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If
22 a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the
23 President shall notify the committees listed
24 in subsection (c)(1) of the intention to obli-
25 gate funds under this section as early as

1 practicable, but not later than 3 days after
2 taking the action to which such notification
3 requirement was applicable in the context
4 of the circumstances necessitating such
5 waiver.

6 **SEC. 202. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO VENEZUELAN**
7 **IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.**

8 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
9 nation with the Administrator of the United States Agen-
10 cy for International Development, shall work through
11 international and nongovernmental organizations to pro-
12 vide Venezuelans in neighboring countries with humani-
13 tarian aid, such as—

14 (1) urgently needed health and nutritional as-
15 sistance, including logistical and technical assistance
16 to hospitals and health centers in affected commu-
17 nities;

18 (2) food assistance for vulnerable individuals,
19 including assistance to improve food security for af-
20 fected communities; and

21 (3) hygiene supplies and sanitation services.

22 (b) **ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.**—The assistance de-
23 scribed in subsection (a)—

24 (1) may be provided—

1 (A) directly to Venezuelans in neighboring
2 countries; or

3 (B) indirectly through the communities in
4 which the Venezuelans reside; and

5 (2) should focus on the most vulnerable Ven-
6 ezuelans in neighboring countries.

7 (c) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—The strategy re-
8 quired under section 201(c) shall include a strategy for
9 carrying out the activities described in subsection (a).

10 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
12 appropriated to the Secretary of State \$200,000,000
13 for fiscal year 2019 to carry out the activities set
14 forth in subsection (a) in accordance with this sec-
15 tion.

16 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

17 (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided
18 under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated
19 or otherwise made available pursuant to para-
20 graph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days
21 after the date on which the President provides
22 notice to the committees listed in section
23 201(c)(1) of the intent to obligate such funds.

24 (B) WAIVER.—

1 (i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of
2 State may waive the requirement under
3 subparagraph (A) if the Secretary deter-
4 mines that such requirement would pose a
5 substantial risk to human health or wel-
6 fare.

7 (ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If
8 a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the
9 President shall notify the committees listed
10 in section 201(c)(1) of the intention to ob-
11 ligate funds under this section as early as
12 practicable, but not later than 3 days after
13 taking the action to which such notification
14 requirement was applicable in the context
15 of the circumstances necessitating such
16 waiver.

17 **SEC. 203. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO COORDINATE**
18 **INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSIST-**
19 **ANCE.**

20 (a) STRATEGY.—The strategy required under section
21 201(c) shall include a multiyear strategy that—

22 (1) describes United States diplomatic efforts to
23 ensure support from international donors, including
24 regional partners in Latin America and the Carib-

1 bean, for the provision of humanitarian assistance to
2 the people of Venezuela;

3 (2) identifies governments that are willing to
4 provide financial and technical assistance for the
5 provision of such humanitarian assistance to the
6 people of Venezuela and a description of such assist-
7 ance; and

8 (3) identifies the financial and technical assist-
9 ance to be provided by multilateral institutions, in-
10 cluding the United Nations humanitarian agencies
11 listed in section 104(a), the Pan American Health
12 Organization, the Inter-American Development
13 Bank, and the World Bank, and a description of
14 such assistance.

15 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
16 State, in consultation with the Administrator of the
17 United States Agency for International Development, shall
18 work with relevant foreign governments and multilateral
19 organizations to coordinate a donors summit and carry out
20 diplomatic engagement to advance the strategy described
21 in subsection (a).

1 **SEC. 204. SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS**
2 **ON THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN VENEZU-**
3 **ELA.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that the United Nations humanitarian agencies, in-
6 cluding the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
7 Affairs, the World Health Organization, the Pan Amer-
8 ican Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Orga-
9 nization, UNICEF, and the United Nations High Com-
10 missioner for Refugees, should conduct and publish inde-
11 pendent assessments regarding—

12 (1) the extent and impact of the shortages of
13 food, medicine, and medical supplies in Venezuela;

14 (2) basic health indicators in Venezuela, such
15 as maternal and child mortality rates and the preva-
16 lence and treatment of communicable diseases; and

17 (3) the efforts needed to resolve the shortages
18 identified in paragraph (1) and to improve the
19 health indicators referred to in paragraph (2).

20 (b) INITIAL EFFORTS.—The President shall instruct
21 the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
22 United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United
23 States in the United Nations Security Council to secure
24 the necessary votes—

1 (1) to place the humanitarian and political cri-
2 sis in Venezuela on the United Nations Security
3 Council's Programme of Work; and

4 (2) to secure a Presidential Statement from the
5 President of the United Nations Security Council
6 urging the Maduro regime—

7 (A) to allow the delivery of humanitarian
8 relief; and

9 (B) to lift bureaucratic impediments or
10 any other obstacles preventing independent non-
11 governmental organizations from providing the
12 proper assistance to the people of Venezuela
13 without any interference by the Maduro regime.

14 (c) UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN COORDI-
15 NATOR.—The President shall instruct the Permanent Rep-
16 resentative to the United Nations to use the voice and in-
17 fluence of the United States to advance the appointment
18 of a United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Ven-
19 ezuela to lead and coordinate the efforts of humanitarian
20 organizations in a manner that contributes to Venezuela's
21 long-term recovery.

22 (d) ADDITIONAL EFFORTS.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—If the Maduro regime re-
24 fuses to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief and
25 to lift bureaucratic impediments and any other ob-

1 stacles described in subsection (b)(2)(B), the Presi-
2 dent, beginning not later than 30 days after the con-
3 clusion of the efforts of the United Nations de-
4 scribed in such subsection, shall instruct the Perma-
5 nent Representative of the United States to the
6 United Nations to use the voice and vote of the
7 United States to secure the adoption of a resolution
8 described in paragraph (2).

9 (2) RESOLUTION DESCRIBED.—The resolution
10 described in this paragraph is a Resolution of the
11 United Nations Security Council that—

12 (A) requires the Maduro regime to prompt-
13 ly allow safe and unhindered access for humani-
14 tarian agencies and their implementing part-
15 ners, including possible support from neigh-
16 boring countries; and

17 (B) calls on the Maduro regime—

18 (i) to allow the delivery of food and
19 medicine to the people of Venezuela;

20 (ii) to end human rights violations
21 against the people of Venezuela;

22 (iii) to agree to free, fair, and trans-
23 parent elections with credible international
24 observers;

1 (iv) to cease violence against the peo-
2 ple of Venezuela; and

3 (v) to release all political prisoners
4 held by the Maduro regime.

5 **SEC. 205. SANCTIONS EXCEPTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN AS-**
6 **SISTANCE.**

7 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

8 (1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term
9 “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given
10 that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade
11 Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

12 (2) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term “medical de-
13 vice” has the meaning given the term “device” in
14 section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
15 metic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

16 (3) MEDICINE.—The term “medicine” has the
17 meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the
18 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
19 321).

20 (b) IN GENERAL.—Any transaction for the sale of ag-
21 ricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices
22 to Venezuela or for the provision of humanitarian assist-
23 ance to the people of Venezuela, and any transaction that
24 is incidental or necessary to any such transaction, regard-
25 less of whether the transactions or provision of humani-

1 tarian assistance originate in, or have a connection to, the
2 United States, shall be exempt from United States sanc-
3 tions, including sanctions described in—

4 (1) sections 603, 605, 606, 608, and 701;

5 (2) the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights
6 and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–
7 278); or

8 (3) Executive Orders 13692, 13808, 13827,
9 13835, 13850, and 13857.

10 **TITLE III—ADDRESSING REGIME** 11 **COHESION**

12 **SEC. 301. CLASSIFIED REPORT ON DECLINING COHESION** 13 **INSIDE THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY AND** 14 **THE MADURO REGIME.**

15 (a) **REPORTING REQUIREMENT.**—Not later than 30
16 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
17 retary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intelligence
18 and Research, and in coordination with the Director of
19 National Intelligence, shall submit a classified report to
20 the appropriate congressional committees that assesses
21 the declining cohesion inside the Venezuelan military and
22 security forces and the Maduro regime.

23 (b) **ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.**—The report submitted
24 under subsection (a) shall—

1 (1) identify senior members of the Venezuelan
2 military and the Maduro regime, including generals,
3 admirals, cabinet ministers, deputy cabinet min-
4 isters, and the heads of intelligence agencies, whose
5 loyalty to Nicolás Maduro is declining;

6 (2) describe the factors that would accelerate
7 the decision making of individuals identified in para-
8 graph (1)—

9 (A) to break with the Maduro regime; and

10 (B) to recognize the Interim President of
11 Venezuela and his government; and

12 (3) assess and detail the massive number of de-
13 sertions and defections that have occurred at the of-
14 ficer and enlisted levels inside the Venezuelan mili-
15 tary and security forces.

16 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—

17 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-
18 mittees” means—

19 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
20 Senate;

21 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
22 Senate;

23 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
24 House of Representatives; and

1 (4) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
2 ligence of the House of Representatives.

3 **SEC. 302. ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON VISAS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall im-
5 pose the visa restrictions described in subsection (c) on
6 any current or former official of the Maduro regime, or
7 any foreign person acting on behalf of such regime, who
8 the Secretary determines—

9 (1) is responsible for, is complicit in, is respon-
10 sible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing,
11 or is knowingly participating in (directly or indi-
12 rectly) any activity in or in relation to Venezuela, on
13 or after January 23, 2019, that undermines or
14 threatens the integrity of—

15 (A) the democratically elected National As-
16 sembly of Venezuela; or

17 (B) the President of such National Assem-
18 bly, while serving as Interim President of Ven-
19 ezuela, or the government officials under the
20 supervision of such President;

21 (2) is the spouse or child of a foreign person
22 described in paragraph (1); or

23 (3) is the spouse or child of a foreign person
24 described or identified under—

1 (A) section 5(a) of the Venezuela Defense
2 of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014
3 (Public Law 113–278), as amended by section
4 603 of this Act;

5 (B) section 804(b) of the Foreign Nar-
6 cotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C.
7 1903(b)); or

8 (C) Executive Orders 13692 (50 U.S.C.
9 1701 note) and 13850.

10 (b) REMOVAL FROM VISA REVOCATION LIST.—If a
11 person described in subsection (a)(1) or in subparagraphs
12 (A) through (C) of subsection (a)(3) publicly recognizes
13 and pledges supports for the Interim President of Ven-
14 ezuela and the government officials supervised by such In-
15 terim President, any family members of such person who
16 were subject to visa restrictions pursuant to paragraph (2)
17 or (3) of such subsection shall no longer be subject to such
18 visa restrictions.

19 (c) VISA RESTRICTIONS DESCRIBED.—

20 (1) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES
21 AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTA-
22 TION.—Subject to paragraph (2) and subsection (b),
23 an alien described in subsection (a)—

24 (A) is inadmissible to the United States;

1 (B) is ineligible to receive a visa or other
2 documentation authorizing entry into the
3 United States;

4 (C) is otherwise ineligible to be admitted or
5 paroled into the United States or to receive any
6 benefit under the Immigration and Nationality
7 Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); and

8 (D) shall, in accordance with section 221(i)
9 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
10 U.S.C. 1201(i)), have his or her visa or other
11 documentation revoked, regardless of when the
12 visa or other documentation was issued.

13 (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-
14 TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions
15 under paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if
16 admitting the alien into the United States is nec-
17 essary to permit the United States to comply with
18 the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the
19 United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,
20 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
21 between the United Nations and the United States,
22 or other applicable international obligations.

23 (d) RULEMAKING.—The President shall issue such
24 regulations, licenses, and orders as may be necessary to
25 carry out this section.

1 **SEC. 303. WAIVER FOR SANCTIONED OFFICIALS THAT REC-**
2 **OGNIZE THE INTERIM PRESIDENT OF VEN-**
3 **EZUELA.**

4 (a) REMOVAL FROM VISA REVOCATION LIST.—If a
5 person sanctioned under any of the provisions of law de-
6 scribed in subsection (b) publicly recognizes and pledges
7 supports for the Interim President of Venezuela and the
8 government officials supervised by such Interim President,
9 the person shall no longer be subject to such sanctions.

10 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
11 scribed in this subsection are set forth in the following
12 provisions of law:

13 (1)(A) Paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 5(a)
14 of the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
15 Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278), as
16 amended by section 603 of this Act.

17 (B) Paragraph (5) of section 5(a) of such Act,
18 to the extent such paragraph relates to the sanctions
19 described in paragraph (3) or (4) of such subsection.

20 (2)(A) Clauses (1) and (4) of section 1(a)(ii)(A)
21 of Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

22 (B) Subparagraph (D)(2) of section 1(a)(ii) of
23 such Executive Order, to the extent such subpara-
24 graph relates to the provisions of law cited in sub-
25 paragraph (A).

1 (3)(A) Section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order
2 13850.

3 (B) Paragraph (iii) of section 1(a) of such Ex-
4 ecutive Order, to the extent such paragraph relates
5 to the provision of law cited in subparagraph (A).

6 (c) RULEMAKING.—The President shall issue such
7 regulations, licenses, and orders as may be necessary to
8 carry out this section.

9 **TITLE IV—RESTORING DEMOC-**
10 **RACY AND ADDRESSING THE**
11 **POLITICAL CRISIS IN VEN-**
12 **EZUELA**

13 **SEC. 401. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR VENEZUELA AND TASK**
14 **FORCE ON VENEZUELA.**

15 (a) DESIGNATION.—Not later than 30 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
17 shall designate a Special Envoy for Venezuela (referred
18 to in this section as the “Special Envoy”), who shall—

19 (1) have the rank and status of ambassador;
20 and

21 (2) report directly to the Secretary of State.

22 (b) DUTIES.—The Special Envoy shall—

23 (1) coordinate United States policy towards
24 Venezuela between relevant departments and agen-
25 cies, including the Department of State, the Depart-

1 ment of the Treasury, the Department of Justice,
2 the Department of Defense, the United States Agen-
3 cy for International Development, and the intel-
4 ligence community;

5 (2) develop and conduct oversight of United
6 States programs and operations related to Ven-
7 ezuela, including humanitarian assistance, support
8 for regional migration systems, and assistance to
9 democratic actors and independent civil society in
10 Venezuela;

11 (3) advance efforts—

12 (A) to recover the assets described in sec-
13 tion 502(a)(2) that were stolen from the Ven-
14 ezuelan people; and

15 (B) to coordinate sanctions with the
16 United States partners referred to in section
17 601;

18 (4) engage and coordinate policy matters re-
19 lated to Venezuela with the international community,
20 including the Organization of American States, the
21 United Nations and its agencies, the Lima Group,
22 the European Union, and other governments and or-
23 ganizations with interest in Venezuela;

24 (5) engage and coordinate with actors sup-
25 porting the restoration of democracy in Venezuela,

1 including the Venezuelan diaspora and the demo-
2 cratic political opposition in Venezuela; and

3 (6) communicate and coordinate engagement
4 with the Maduro regime.

5 (c) AUTHORIZATION.—Notwithstanding any other
6 provision of law, the Special Envoy is authorized to di-
7 rectly engage with the Maduro regime and its officers.

8 (d) TASK FORCE ON VENEZUELA.—

9 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established an
10 interagency task force, to be known as the “Task
11 Force on Venezuela” (referred to in this subsection
12 as the “Task Force”).

13 (2) MISSION.—The primary mission of the
14 Task Force is to support the Special Envoy in the
15 exercise of the duties described in subsection (b).

16 (3) COMPOSITION.—The Task Force shall in-
17 clude representatives of, or liaison officers from, the
18 Department of State, the Department of the Treas-
19 ury, the Department of Justice, the Department of
20 Defense, the United States Agency for International
21 Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
22 Members of the Task Force shall be selected from
23 among existing employees of their respective depart-
24 ments.

1 (e) MONTHLY CONSULTATION.—Not later than 30
2 days after being designated under subsection (a), and
3 every 30 days thereafter, the Special Envoy shall brief and
4 consult with—

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
6 Senate;

7 (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
8 Senate;

9 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
10 House of Representatives; and

11 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
12 House of Representatives.

13 **SEC. 402. SUPPORT FOR THE LIMA GROUP.**

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
15 ings:

16 (1) The Lima Group is a diplomatic bloc whose
17 members include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
18 Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Hon-
19 duras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Saint Lucia.

20 (2) The Lima Group—

21 (A) has recognized National Assembly
22 President Juan Guaidó as the Interim Presi-
23 dent of Venezuela;

1 (B) has reaffirmed the authority of the
2 democratically elected National Assembly of
3 Venezuela;

4 (C) has stated that it does not recognize
5 the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro’s tenure in of-
6 fice beyond January 10, 2019;

7 (D) has stated that it does not recognize
8 the legitimacy of Venezuela’s May 20, 2018,
9 presidential election as it did not comply with
10 international standards for a democratic, free,
11 fair, and transparent process;

12 (E) has called on Nicolás Maduro to provi-
13 sionally transfer executive powers to the Na-
14 tional Assembly of Venezuela until new demo-
15 cratic elections are held;

16 (F) has condemned the rupture of the
17 democratic order in Venezuela;

18 (G) has called on the Maduro regime to ac-
19 cept humanitarian assistance in order to ad-
20 dress the country’s growing economic crisis; and

21 (H) reiterated its “conviction that the
22 transition to democracy must be conducted by
23 Venezuelans themselves, peacefully and within
24 the framework of the Constitution and inter-

1 national law, supported by political and diplo-
2 matic means, without the use of force.”.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the Secretary of State should conduct diplo-
5 matic engagement in support of efforts by the Lima Group
6 to restore democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela and
7 facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance for the
8 Venezuelan people.

9 **SEC. 403. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN-**
10 **ITY.**

11 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
12 ings:

13 (1) On July 25, 2017, the Secretary General of
14 the Organization of American States stated “the
15 systematic attack against the civilian population [of
16 Venezuela] includes murders, imprisonment and tor-
17 ture, and it is evident in the eyes of the inter-
18 national community that we are in the presence of
19 crimes against humanity.”.

20 (2) On September 11, 2017, the United Na-
21 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights stated
22 that Venezuelan security forces may have committed
23 crimes against humanity against protesters and
24 called for a credible international investigation.

1 (3) A November 29, 2017, report by Human
2 Rights Watch documented that Venezuelan security
3 forces had used extreme and, at times, lethal forces
4 against protesters and, once detained, subjected
5 them to abuses ranging from severe beatings to tor-
6 ture involving electric shocks, asphyxiation, and
7 other techniques.

8 (4) On February 8, 2018, the Prosecutor of the
9 International Criminal Court opened a preliminary
10 examination of the situation in Venezuela as it re-
11 lates to Venezuelan security forces using excessive
12 force against civilians and the political opposition.

13 (5) On May 29, 2018, a panel of independent
14 international experts convened by the Secretary Gen-
15 eral of the Organization of American States found
16 that “there are reasonable grounds that satisfy the
17 standard of proof required by Article 53 of the
18 Rome Statute for considering that acts to which the
19 civilian population of Venezuela was subjected . . .
20 constitute crimes against humanity”.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that the Secretary of State should conduct robust
23 diplomatic engagement in support of efforts in Venezuela,
24 and on the part of the international community, to ensure
25 accountability for possible crimes against humanity and

1 other violations of international humanitarian law and vio-
2 lations and abuses of human rights.

3 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
4 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
5 submit a report to Congress that—

6 (1) evaluates the degree to which the Maduro
7 regime and its officials, including members of the
8 Venezuelan security force, have engaged in actions
9 that constitute crimes against humanity and viola-
10 tions of internationally recognized humanitarian
11 rights; and

12 (2) provides options for holding accountable the
13 perpetrators identified under paragraph (1).

14 **SEC. 404. UPHOLDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN**
15 **STATES INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC**
16 **CHARTER.**

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
18 ings:

19 (1) Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic
20 Charter, which was adopted by the Organization of
21 American States in Lima on September 11, 2001,
22 states: “The peoples of the Americas have a right to
23 democracy and their governments have an obligation
24 to promote and defend it.”.

1 (2) Article 19 of the Inter-American Demo-
2 cratic Charter states “an unconstitutional interrup-
3 tion of the democratic order or an unconstitutional
4 alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
5 impairs the democratic order in a member state,
6 constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable ob-
7 stacle to its government’s participation in sessions of
8 the General Assembly . . . and other bodies of the
9 Organization.”.

10 (3) Article 20 of the Inter-American Demo-
11 cratic Charter states the following:

12 (A) “In the event of an unconstitutional al-
13 teration of the constitutional regime that seri-
14 ously impairs the democratic order in a member
15 state, any member state or the Secretary Gen-
16 eral may request the immediate convocation of
17 the Permanent Council to undertake a collective
18 assessment of the situation and to take such de-
19 cisions as it deems appropriate.”.

20 (B) “The Permanent Council, depending
21 on the situation, may undertake the necessary
22 diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to
23 foster the restoration of democracy.”.

24 (4) Article 21 of the Inter-American Demo-
25 cratic Charter states “When the special session of

1 the General Assembly determines that there has
2 been an unconstitutional interruption of the demo-
3 cratic order of a member state, and that diplomatic
4 initiatives have failed, the special session shall take
5 the decision to suspend said member state.”.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) Nicolás Maduro and the Supreme Tribunal
9 of Justice of Venezuela have carried out systematic
10 efforts to undermine, block, and circumvent the au-
11 thorities and responsibilities of the Venezuelan Na-
12 tional Assembly, as mandated in the Constitution of
13 the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

14 (2) the electoral process convened by the Na-
15 tional Electoral Council of Venezuela on May 20,
16 2018 was not democratic, free, fair, or transparent;

17 (3) Nicolás Maduro’s attempt to inaugurate
18 himself for a second term in office on January 10,
19 2019, was not legitimate;

20 (4) such events constitute an unconstitutional
21 alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
22 impairs the democratic order in Venezuela; and

23 (5) the Secretary of State, working through the
24 United States Permanent Representative to the Or-
25 ganization of American States, should take addi-

1 tional steps to support ongoing efforts by the Sec-
2 retary General—

3 (A) to invoke the Inter-American Demo-
4 cratic Charter; and

5 (B) to promote diplomatic initiatives to
6 foster the restoration of Venezuelan democracy.

7 **SEC. 405. SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OB-**
8 **SERVATION AND DEMOCRATIC CIVIL SOCI-**
9 **ETY.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
11 nation with the Administrator of the United States Agen-
12 cy for International Development—

13 (1) shall work with the Organization of Amer-
14 ican States to ensure credible international observa-
15 tion of future elections in Venezuela that contributes
16 to free, fair, and transparent democratic electoral
17 processes; and

18 (2) shall work through nongovernmental organi-
19 zations—

20 (A) to strengthen democratic governance
21 and institutions, including the democratically
22 elected National Assembly of Venezuela;

23 (B) to defend internationally recognized
24 human rights for the people of Venezuela, in-
25 cluding support for efforts to document crimes

1 against humanity and violations of human
2 rights;

3 (C) to support the efforts of independent
4 media outlets to broadcast, distribute, and
5 share information beyond the limited channels
6 made available by the Maduro regime; and

7 (D) to combat corruption and improve the
8 transparency and accountability of institutions
9 that are part of the Maduro regime.

10 (b) VOICE AND VOTE AT THE ORGANIZATION OF
11 AMERICAN STATES.—The Secretary of State, acting
12 through the United States Permanent Representative to
13 the Organization of American States, should advocate and
14 build diplomatic support for sending an election observa-
15 tion mission to Venezuela to ensure that democratic elec-
16 toral processes are organized and carried out in a free,
17 fair, and transparent manner.

18 (c) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
19 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
20 retary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of
21 the United States Agency for International Development,
22 shall submit a strategy to carry out the activities described
23 in subsection (a) to—

24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
25 Senate;

1 (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
2 Senate;

3 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
4 House of Representatives; and

5 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 House of Representatives.

7 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be
9 appropriated to the Secretary of State for fiscal year
10 2019—

11 (A) \$500,000 to carry out the activities de-
12 scribed in subsection (a)(1); and

13 (B) \$14,500,000 to carry out the activities
14 described in subsection (a)(2).

15 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided
17 under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated
18 or otherwise made available pursuant to para-
19 graph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days
20 after the date on which the President provides
21 notice to the committees listed in subsection (c)
22 of intent to obligate such funds.

23 (B) WAIVER.—

24 (i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of
25 State may waive the notification require-

1 ment under subparagraph (A) if the Sec-
2 retary determines that such waiver is in
3 the national security interest of the United
4 States.

5 (ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If
6 a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the
7 Secretary of State shall notify the commit-
8 tees listed in subsection (c) of the intention
9 to obligate funds under this section as
10 early as practicable, but not later than 3
11 days after taking the action to which such
12 notification requirement was applicable in
13 the context of the circumstances necessi-
14 tating such waiver.

15 **TITLE V—SUPPORTING THE RE-**
16 **CONSTRUCTION OF VENEZU-**
17 **ELA**

18 **SEC. 501. ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITU-**
19 **TIONS TO ADVANCE THE RECONSTRUCTION**
20 **OF VENEZUELA’S ECONOMY AND ENERGY IN-**
21 **FRAStructure.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall engage the
23 International Monetary Fund and the Multilateral Devel-
24 opment Banks to create a framework for the economic re-

1 construction of Venezuela, contingent upon the restoration
2 of democracy and the rule of law in the country.

3 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The framework cre-
4 ated under subsection (a) should include policy pro-
5 posals—

6 (1) to provide Venezuelans with humanitarian
7 assistance, poverty alleviation, and a social safety
8 net;

9 (2) to advance debt restructuring and debt sus-
10 tainability measures;

11 (3) to restore the production and efficient man-
12 agement of Venezuela’s oil industry, including re-
13 building energy infrastructure;

14 (4) to eliminate price controls and market dis-
15 torting subsidies in the Venezuelan economy; and

16 (5) to address hyperinflation in Venezuela.

17 (c) CONSULTATION.—In creating the framework
18 under subsection (a), the President shall consult with rel-
19 evant stakeholders in the humanitarian (including inter-
20 national and nongovernmental organizations), financial,
21 and energy sectors.

22 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
23 gress that any effort to conduct debt restructuring
24 should—

1 (1) include discussions with China, which is
2 Venezuela’s biggest creditor; and

3 (2) appropriately account for China’s and Rus-
4 sia’s high-risk lending to Venezuela.

5 (e) CERTIFICATION.—The President may not support
6 lending or financing for Venezuela from the International
7 Monetary Fund and the Multilateral Development Banks
8 until the Secretary of State submits a report to the Com-
9 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and Committee
10 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives certi-
11 fying that any such lending or financing—

12 (1) would be managed by the Interim President
13 of Venezuela or a new, democratically elected Presi-
14 dent;

15 (2) would not be used to repay external credi-
16 tors who are not members of the Group of Seven un-
17 less such payments are essential to the restoration
18 of economic stability and democracy in Venezuela;
19 and

20 (3) would not benefit the Maduro regime.

21 **SEC. 502. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE VEN-**
22 **EZUELAN PEOPLE.**

23 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
24 ings:

1 (1) Venezuela ranked 169th out of 180 coun-
2 tries in Transparency International's Corruption
3 Perception Index 2017.

4 (2) In March 2015, the Department of the
5 Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
6 determined that approximately \$2,000,000,000 had
7 been siphoned from Venezuela's public oil company,
8 Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., in conjunction with its
9 designation of the Banca Privada d'Andorra as a
10 Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
11 Laundering Concern.

12 (b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
13 nation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attor-
14 ney General, shall advance a coordinated international ef-
15 fort—

16 (1) to carry out special financial investigations
17 to identify and track assets taken from the people
18 and institutions of Venezuela through theft, corrup-
19 tion, money laundering, or other illicit means; and

20 (2) work with foreign governments—

21 (A) to share financial investigations intel-
22 ligence, as appropriate;

23 (B) to block the assets identified pursuant
24 to paragraph (1); and

1 (C) to advance necessary civil forfeiture
2 litigation, including providing technical assist-
3 ance to help governments establish the nec-
4 essary legal framework to carry out asset for-
5 feitures.

6 (c) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The coordinated inter-
7 national effort described in subsection (b) shall—

8 (1) include input from—

9 (A) the Office of Foreign Assets Control of
10 the Department of the Treasury;

11 (B) the Financial Crimes Enforcement
12 Network of the Department of the Treasury;
13 and

14 (C) the Money Laundering and Asset Re-
15 covery Section of the Department of Justice;

16 (2) identify appropriate steps to advance nec-
17 essary civil forfeiture litigation in the United States;

18 (3) include an assessment of whether the
19 United States or another member of the inter-
20 national community should establish a managed
21 fund to hold the assets identified pursuant to sub-
22 section (b)(1) that could be returned to a future
23 democratic government in Venezuela; and

24 (4) include recommendations for new legislative
25 and regulatory measures in the United States that

1 would be needed to establish and manage the fund
2 described in paragraph (3).

3 (d) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
4 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
5 retary of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out
6 the activities described in subsection (b) to—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
8 Senate;

9 (2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
10 Urban Affairs of the Senate;

11 (3) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-
12 ate;

13 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
14 House of Representatives;

15 (5) the Committee on Financial Services of the
16 House of Representatives; and

17 (6) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
18 House of Representatives.

1 **TITLE VI—RESTORING THE**
2 **RULE OF LAW IN VENEZUELA**

3 **SEC. 601. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A COORDI-**
4 **NATED SANCTIONS STRATEGY WITH PART-**
5 **NERS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND**
6 **THE EUROPEAN UNION.**

7 (a) **STRENGTHENING SANCTIONS CAPACITY IN LATIN**
8 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**—The Secretary of State,
9 working through the Assistant Secretary of State for
10 International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and
11 the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
12 ness Affairs, and in consultation with the Secretary of the
13 Treasury, shall provide technical assistance to partner
14 governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to assist
15 such governments in establishing the legislative and regu-
16 latory frameworks needed to impose targeted sanctions on
17 officials of the Maduro regime who—

- 18 (1) are responsible for human rights abuses;
19 (2) have engaged in public corruption; or
20 (3) are undermining democratic institutions and
21 processes in Venezuela.

22 (b) **COORDINATING INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS.**—
23 The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
24 of the Treasury, shall engage in diplomatic efforts with
25 partner governments, including the Government of Can-

1 ada, governments in the European Union, and govern-
2 ments in Latin America and the Caribbean, to impose tar-
3 geted sanctions on the officials described in subsection (a).

4 (c) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90
5 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
7 Treasury, shall submit a strategy for carrying out the ac-
8 tivities described in subsection (a) to—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
10 Senate;

11 (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
12 Senate;

13 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
14 House of Representatives; and

15 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
16 House of Representatives.

17 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
19 appropriated, to the Department of State,
20 \$3,000,000 for fiscal year 2019 to carry out the ac-
21 tivities set forth in subsection (a) in accordance with
22 this section.

23 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

24 (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided
25 under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated

1 or otherwise made available pursuant to para-
2 graph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days
3 after the date on which the President provides
4 notice to the committees listed in subsection (c)
5 of the intent to obligate such funds.

6 (B) WAIVER.—

7 (i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of
8 State may waive the requirement under
9 subparagraph (A) if the Secretary of State
10 determines that such waiver is in the na-
11 tional security interest of the United
12 States.

13 (ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If
14 a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the
15 President shall notify the committees listed
16 in subsection (c) of the intention to obli-
17 gate funds under this section as early as
18 practicable, but not later than 3 days after
19 taking the action to which such notification
20 requirement was applicable in the context
21 of the circumstances necessitating such
22 waiver.

1 **SEC. 602. CLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF**
2 **VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS IN CORRUPTION**
3 **AND ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.**

4 (a) **BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.**—Not later than 90
5 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intelligence
7 and Research, and in coordination with the Director of
8 National Intelligence, shall brief the appropriate congres-
9 sional committees on the involvement of senior officials of
10 the Maduro regime, including members of the National
11 Electoral Council, the judicial system, and the Venezuelan
12 security forces, in illicit narcotics trafficking and acts of
13 corruption in Venezuela.

14 (b) **ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.**—The briefing provided
15 under subsection (a) shall—

16 (1) describe how the acts of corruption de-
17 scribed in the report pose challenges for United
18 States national security and impact the rule of law
19 and democratic governance in countries of the West-
20 ern Hemisphere;

21 (2) identify individuals that frustrate the ability
22 of the United States to combat illicit narcotics traf-
23 ficking;

24 (3) include an assessment of the relationship
25 between individuals identified under subsection (a)
26 and Nicolás Maduro or members of his cabinet; and

1 (4) include input from the Drug Enforcement
2 Administration, the Office of Foreign Assets Con-
3 trol, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
4 work.

5 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—
6 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-
7 mittees” means—

8 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
9 Senate;

10 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
11 Senate;

12 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
13 House of Representatives; and

14 (4) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
15 ligence of the House of Representatives.

16 **SEC. 603. SANCTIONS ON PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PUB-**
17 **LIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERMINING DEMO-**
18 **CRATIC GOVERNANCE.**

19 (a) FINDING.—Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C.
20 1701 note), which was signed on March 8, 2015, estab-
21 lished sanctions against individuals responsible for under-
22 mining democratic processes and institutions and involved
23 in acts of public corruption that were not included in the
24 Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act
25 of 2014 (Public Law 113–278).

1 (b) SANCTIONS.—Section 5(a) of the Venezuela De-
2 fense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014
3 (Public Law 113–278) is amended—

4 (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)—

5 (A) by striking “Government of Ven-
6 ezuela” and inserting “Maduro regime (as de-
7 fined in section 4 of the Venezuela Emergency
8 Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development
9 Act of 2019)”; and

10 (B) by striking “that Government” and in-
11 serting “that regime”;

12 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking “or” at the
13 end;

14 (3) by redesignating paragraph (3) as para-
15 graph (5);

16 (4) by inserting after paragraph (2) the fol-
17 lowing:

18 “(3) is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering,
19 controlling, or otherwise directing, significant actions
20 or policies that undermine democratic processes or
21 institutions;

22 “(4) is a government official, or a senior asso-
23 ciate of such an official, that is responsible for, or
24 complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise di-
25 recting, acts of significant corruption, including the

1 expropriation of private or public assets for personal
2 gain, corruption related to government contracts or
3 the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the
4 facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption
5 to foreign jurisdictions; or”; and

6 (5) in paragraph (5), as redesignated, by strik-
7 ing “paragraph (1) or (2)” and inserting “para-
8 graph (1), (2), (3), or (4)”.

9 **SEC. 604. PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT SANCTIONED OFFI-**
10 **CIALS.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
13 thereafter, except as provided in subsection (c), the Sec-
14 retary of Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of
15 State, shall submit a report to Congress that describes the
16 total assessed value of blocked assets of Venezuelans des-
17 ignated under sanctions authorized under—

18 (1) the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation
19 Act (title VIII of Public Law 106–120; 21 U.S.C.
20 1901 et seq.);

21 (2) the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights
22 and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–
23 278), as amended by section 603 of this Act; or

24 (3) Executive Orders 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701
25 note) and 13850.

1 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—Reports submitted
2 under subsection (a) should provide descriptions of specific
3 cases that are most representative of the endemic corrup-
4 tion and illicit financial activities occurring in Venezuela.

5 (c) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—The Secretary of
6 Treasury is not required to submit an updated report to
7 Congress under subsection (a) unless, since the submission
8 of the preceding report—

9 (1) there has been meaningful change in the
10 value of blocked assets; or

11 (2) additional individuals have been targeted for
12 sanctions under the authorities listed in subsection
13 (a).

14 (d) BRIEFINGS.—If the Secretary of Treasury exer-
15 cises the exception described in subsection (c), the Sec-
16 retary of the Treasury, or designee, shall immediately brief
17 Congress regarding—

18 (1) the decision to exercise the exception; and

19 (2) information related to the value of blocked
20 assets described in subsection (a).

21 (e) FORM.—Reports required under this section shall
22 be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a clas-
23 sified annex.

1 **SEC. 605. FINANCIAL SANCTIONS ON MADURO REGIME**
2 **DEBT.**

3 (a) FINDING.—Executive Order 13808 (82 Fed. Reg.
4 41155), which was signed on August 24, 2017, established
5 sanctions against the Maduro regime’s ability to issue
6 public debt.

7 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section and in sections
8 606 and 608:

9 (1) ENTITY.—The term “entity” means a part-
10 nership, association, trust, joint venture, corpora-
11 tion, group, subgroup, or other organization.

12 (2) PERSON.—The term “person” means an in-
13 dividual or entity.

14 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
15 “United States person” means any—

16 (A) United States citizen;

17 (B) alien lawfully admitted for permanent
18 residence to the United States;

19 (C) entity organized under the laws of the
20 United States or any jurisdiction within the
21 United States (including a foreign branch of
22 any such entity); and

23 (D) any person physically located in the
24 United States.

25 (c) IN GENERAL.—The President may prohibit, in
26 the United States or by a United States person—

1 (1) any transaction related to, provision of fi-
2 nancing for, or other dealing in—

3 (A) debt instruments with a maturity of
4 greater than 90 days issued by *Petróleos de*
5 *Venezuela, S.A.*, on or after the date of the en-
6 actment of this Act;

7 (B) debt instruments with a maturity of
8 greater than 30 days or equity issued by the
9 *Maduro* regime on or after the date of the en-
10 actment of this Act, excluding debt instruments
11 issued by *Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.*, that are
12 not covered under subparagraph (A);

13 (C) bonds issued by the *Maduro* regime be-
14 fore the date of the enactment of this Act; or

15 (D) dividend payments or other distribu-
16 tions of profits to the *Maduro* regime from any
17 entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,
18 by the *Maduro* regime;

19 (2) the direct or indirect purchase of securities
20 from the *Maduro* regime, except for—

21 (A) securities qualifying as debt instru-
22 ments issued by *Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.*,
23 on or after the date of the enactment of this
24 Act that are not described in paragraph (1)(A);
25 and

1 (B) securities qualifying as debt instru-
2 ments issued by the Maduro regime on or after
3 the date of the enactment of this Act that are
4 not described in paragraph (1)(B);

5 (3) any transaction that evades or avoids, has
6 the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a viola-
7 tion of, or attempts to violate a prohibition under
8 paragraph (1) or (2); and

9 (4) any conspiracy to violate a prohibition
10 under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

11 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that the President should waive the prohibitions de-
13 scribed in subsection (c) and in Executive Order 13808
14 if the related debt instruments, bonds, or securities have
15 been approved or ratified by the democratically elected
16 National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
17 ezuela.

18 (e) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

19 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
20 ercise all authorities described in sections 203 and
21 205 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-
22 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this
23 section.

24 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-
25 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a

1 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or
2 order issued to carry out this section shall be subject
3 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)
4 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-
5 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-
6 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-
7 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

8 **SEC. 606. ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SANCTIONS ON MADURO**
9 **REGIME DEBT.**

10 (a) FINDING.—Executive Order 13835 (83 Fed. Reg.
11 24001), which was signed on May 21, 2018, established
12 additional sanctions against transactions involving the
13 Maduro regime’s existing public debt.

14 (b) PROHIBITION.—The President may prohibit a
15 United States person or any person within the United
16 States from—

17 (1) purchasing any debt owed to the Maduro
18 regime, including accounts receivable;

19 (2) entering into any transaction related to any
20 debt owed to the Maduro regime that is pledged as
21 collateral after May 21, 2018, including accounts re-
22 ceivable; or

23 (3) entering into any transaction involving the
24 selling, transferring, assigning, or pledging as collat-
25 eral by the Maduro regime of any equity interest in

1 any entity in which the Maduro regime has a 50
2 percent or greater ownership interest.

3 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the President should waive the prohibitions de-
5 scribed in subsection (a) and in Executive Order 13835
6 if transactions involving related debt instruments, bonds,
7 or securities have been approved or ratified by the demo-
8 cratically elected National Assembly of Venezuela.

9 (d) ENFORCEMENT.—The Secretary of the Treasury,
10 in consultation with the Secretary of State, may promul-
11 gate such regulations as may be necessary to enforce the
12 prohibition set forth in subsection (b).

13 **SEC. 607. EXPANDING KINGPIN SANCTIONS ON NARCOTICS**
14 **TRAFFICKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
16 ings:

17 (1) On February 13, 2017, the Department of
18 the Treasury designated Venezuelan nationals
19 Tareck El Aissami (the current Vice President of
20 Venezuela) and Samark López Bello pursuant to the
21 Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21
22 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).

23 (2) On May 7, 2018, the Department of the
24 Treasury designated Venezuelan nationals Pedro

1 Luis Martin, Walter Alexander del Nogal, and Mario
2 Antonio Rodríguez pursuant to such Act.

3 (b) FINANCIAL SANCTIONS EXPANSION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treas-
5 ury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State,
6 the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the
7 Central Intelligence Agency shall expand investiga-
8 tions, intelligence collection, and analysis pursuant
9 to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act
10 (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) to facilitate the identifica-
11 tion and support the application of sanctions
12 against—

13 (A) significant foreign narcotics traf-
14 fickers, their organizations and networks; and

15 (B) the foreign persons who provide mate-
16 rial, financial, or technological support to such
17 traffickers, organizations, and networks.

18 (2) TARGETS.—The efforts described in para-
19 graph (1) shall specifically target—

20 (A) senior members of the Maduro regime,
21 including military officers, involved in narcotics
22 trafficking and money laundering;

23 (B) foreign narcotics traffickers and their
24 organizations and networks that are operating
25 in Venezuela; and

1 (C) the foreign persons who provide mate-
2 rial, financial, or technological support to such
3 traffickers, organizations, and networks that
4 are operating in Venezuela.

5 **SEC. 608. SANCTIONS ON THE MADURO REGIME'S TRADE IN**
6 **GOLD.**

7 (a) FINDING.—Executive Order 13850, which was
8 signed on November 1, 2018, established sanctions
9 against the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy.

10 (b) SANCTIONS AUTHORIZED.—The President, in
11 consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
12 Secretary of State, may block and prohibit the transfer,
13 payment, exportation, withdrawal, or other disposition of
14 all property and interests in property of any person that
15 operates in the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy if
16 such property is in the United States, comes into the
17 United States, or is or comes within the possession or con-
18 trol of any United States person.

19 **SEC. 609. CONCERNS OVER PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH**
20 **ROSNEFT.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
22 ings:

23 (1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil
24 company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in
25 this section as “PDVSA”), through a no compete

1 transaction, secured a loan from Russian govern-
2 ment-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 per-
3 cent of PDVSA's American subsidiary, CITGO Pe-
4 troleum Corporation, including its assets in the
5 United States, as collateral. As a result of this
6 transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collat-
7 eral by PDVSA's creditors.

8 (2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of
9 PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and
10 owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in
11 19 States of the United States, including an exten-
12 sive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refin-
13 eries, with a combined oil refining capacity of
14 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO's refinery in Lake
15 Charles, Louisiana, is the sixth largest refinery in
16 the United States.

17 (3) The Department of the Treasury imposed
18 sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Gov-
19 ernment of the Russian Federation, and its Execu-
20 tive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia's mili-
21 tary invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of
22 Crimea in 2014.

23 (4) The Department of Homeland Security has
24 designated the energy sector as critical to United
25 States infrastructure.

1 (5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela
2 raises the probability that the Maduro regime and
3 PDVSA will default on their international debt obli-
4 gations, resulting in a scenario in which Rosneft
5 could come into control of CITGO's United States
6 energy infrastructure holdings.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that—

9 (1) control of critical United States energy in-
10 frastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-con-
11 trolled entity currently under United States sanc-
12 tions that is led by Igor Sechin, who is also under
13 United States sanctions and is a close associate of
14 Vladimir Putin, would pose a significant risk to
15 United States national security and energy security;
16 and

17 (2) a default by PDVSA on its loan from
18 Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession
19 of PDVSA's United States CITGO assets, would
20 warrant careful consideration by the Committee on
21 Foreign Investment in the United States.

22 (c) PREVENTING ROSNEFT FROM CONTROLLING
23 UNITED STATES ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.—The Presi-
24 dent shall take all necessary steps to prevent Rosneft from

1 gaining control of critical United States energy infrastruc-
2 ture.

3 (d) SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland
5 Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
6 shall conduct an assessment of the security risks
7 posed by Russian control of CITGO’s United States
8 energy infrastructure holdings.

9 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
11 Homeland Security shall submit a report to the
12 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the
13 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
14 Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Af-
15 fairs of the House of Representatives, and the Com-
16 mittee on Homeland Security of the House of Rep-
17 resentatives that contains the results of the assess-
18 ment conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).

19 (e) REVIEW OF CITGO TRANSACTIONS.—If PDVSA
20 defaults on its debt obligations, the Secretary of the
21 Treasury should review CITGO’s transactions with United
22 States persons to assess and ensure compliance with
23 United States sanctions policies and regulations.

1 **SEC. 610. CLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON ACTIVITIES OF CER-**
2 **TAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ACTORS**
3 **IN VENEZUELA.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
6 acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
7 of the Department of State, and in coordination with the
8 Director of National Intelligence, shall brief the appro-
9 priate congressional committees on—

10 (1) the full extent of cooperation by the Govern-
11 ment of the Russian Federation, the Government of
12 the People’s Republic of China, the Government of
13 Cuba, and the Government of Iran with the Maduro
14 regime; and

15 (2) the activities inside Venezuelan territory of
16 foreign armed groups, including Colombian criminal
17 organizations and defectors from the Colombian gue-
18 rilla group known as the Revolutionary Armed
19 Forces of Colombia, and foreign terrorist organiza-
20 tions, including the Colombian guerilla group known
21 as the National Liberation Army (ELN).

22 (b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—
23 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-
24 mittees” means—

25 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
26 Senate;

1 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
2 Senate;

3 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
4 House of Representatives; and

5 (4) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
6 ligence of the House of Representatives.

7 **TITLE VII—CRYPTOCURRENCY**
8 **SANCTIONS AND ENSURING**
9 **THE EFFECTIVENESS OF**
10 **UNITED STATES SANCTIONS**

11 **SEC. 701. SANCTIONS ON VENEZUELA’S CRYPTOCURRENCY**
12 **AND THE PROVISION OF RELATED TECH-**
13 **NOLOGIES.**

14 (a) **FINDING.**—Executive Order 13827 (83 Fed. Reg.
15 12469), which was signed on March 19, 2018, established
16 sanctions against the Maduro regime’s ability to issue a
17 digital currency in an effort to circumvent United States
18 sanctions.

19 (b) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

20 (1) **ENTITY.**—The term “entity” means a part-
21 nership, association, trust, joint venture, corpora-
22 tion, group, subgroup, or other organization.

23 (2) **PERSON.**—The term “person” means an in-
24 dividual or entity.

1 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
2 “United States person” means any—

3 (A) United States citizen;

4 (B) alien lawfully admitted for permanent
5 residence to the United States;

6 (C) entity organized under the laws of the
7 United States or any jurisdiction within the
8 United States (including a foreign branch of
9 any such entity); and

10 (D) any person physically located in the
11 United States.

12 (c) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—All transactions by a United
14 States person or within the United States that relate
15 to, provide financing for, provide software for, or
16 otherwise deal in any digital currency, digital coin,
17 or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf
18 of the Maduro regime are prohibited beginning on
19 the date of the enactment of this Act.

20 (2) APPLICABILITY.—The prohibitions under
21 paragraph (1) shall apply to the extent provided by
22 statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or li-
23 censes that may be issued pursuant to this Act, and
24 notwithstanding any contract entered into or any li-

1 cense or permit granted before the date of the enact-
2 ment of this Act.

3 (3) PROHIBITIONS.—Any transaction that
4 evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or
5 avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate
6 any of the prohibitions set forth in this subsection
7 is prohibited. Any conspiracy formed to violate any
8 of the prohibitions set forth in this subsection is pro-
9 hibited.

10 (d) RULEMAKING.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treas-
12 ury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is
13 authorized to take such actions, including promul-
14 gating rules and regulations, to implement this sec-
15 tion.

16 (2) DELEGATION.—The Secretary of the Treas-
17 ury may redelegate any of the functions described in
18 paragraph (1) to other officers and executive depart-
19 ments and agencies of the United States Govern-
20 ment. All agencies of the United States Government
21 shall take all appropriate measures within their au-
22 thority to carry out the provisions of this section.

1 **SEC. 702. REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF CRYPTOCURREN-**
2 **CIES ON UNITED STATES SANCTIONS.**

3 (a) **DEFINED TERM.**—In this section, the term “ap-
4 propriate congressional committees” means—

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
6 Senate;

7 (2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
8 Urban Affairs of the Senate;

9 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
10 House of Representatives; and

11 (4) the Committee on Financial Services of the
12 House of Representatives.

13 (b) **REPORTING REQUIREMENT.**—Not later than 180
14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
15 retary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of
16 the Treasury, the Chairman of the Securities and Ex-
17 change Commission, and the Chairman of the Commodity
18 Futures Trading Commission, shall submit a report to the
19 appropriate congressional committees that provides an as-
20 sessment on how digital currencies affect the effectiveness
21 of United States sanctions around the world.

22 (c) **ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.**—The report submitted
23 under subsection (b) shall—

24 (1) describe any global efforts, including efforts
25 by states, state-sponsored actors, and non-state-
26 sponsored actors, to utilize digital currencies to

1 evade or circumvent United States sanctions, includ-
2 ing through the direct or indirect use of products or
3 services of United States based technology, software,
4 or financial services firms; and

5 (2) include recommendations for new legislative
6 and regulatory measures needed to strengthen the
7 United States Government's ability to prevent
8 states, state-sponsored actors, and non-state-spon-
9 sored actors from using digital currencies to evade
10 or circumvent United States sanctions, including
11 through the direct or indirect use of products or
12 services of United States based technology, software,
13 or financial services firms.

14 (d) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection
15 (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
16 clude a classified annex.

17 **TITLE VIII—MISCELLANEOUS** 18 **PROVISIONS**

19 **SEC. 801. CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.**

20 (a) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE; SANCTIONED CO-
21 ORDINATION.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after
23 any congressional committee listed under paragraph
24 (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
25 of section 201, 202, 203, or 601, the Secretary of

1 State and the Administrator of the United States
2 Agency for International Development shall provide
3 such briefing to such committee.

4 (2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The com-
5 mittees listed under this paragraph are—

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
7 the Senate;

8 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
9 the Senate;

10 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
11 the House of Representatives; and

12 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
13 the House of Representatives.

14 (b) UNITED NATIONS; NEGOTIATED SOLUTION;
15 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after
17 any congressional committee listed under paragraph
18 (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
19 of section 103, 204, or 403, the Secretary of State
20 shall provide such briefing to such committee.

21 (2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The con-
22 gressional committees listed under this paragraph
23 are—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
25 the Senate; and

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives.

3 (c) REGIME COHESION; CORRUPTION AND NAR-
4 COTICS TRAFFICKING; FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ACTIVI-
5 TIES.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after
7 a congressional committee listed under paragraph
8 (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
9 of section 301, 602, or 610, the Secretary of State
10 and the Director of National Intelligence shall pro-
11 vide such briefing to such committee.

12 (2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The con-
13 gressional committees listed under this paragraph
14 are—

15 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
16 the Senate;

17 (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence
18 of the Senate;

19 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
20 the House of Representatives; and

21 (D) the Permanent Select Committee on
22 Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

23 (d) INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION.—Not
24 later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed
25 under subsection (a)(2) requests a briefing regarding the

1 implementation of section 405, the Secretary of State, the
2 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
3 national Development, and the United States Ambassador
4 to the Organization of American States shall provide such
5 briefing to such committee.

6 (e) VISA RESTRICTIONS; SANCTIONS WAIVER.—Not
7 later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed
8 under subsection (b)(2) requests a briefing regarding the
9 implementation of section 302 or 303, the Secretary of
10 State shall provide such briefing to such committee.

11 (f) RECONSTRUCTION OF VENEZUELA'S ENERGY IN-
12 FRASTRUCTURE.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after
14 a congressional committee listed under paragraph
15 (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
16 of section 501, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
17 of Energy, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall
18 provide such briefing to such committee.

19 (2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The con-
20 gressional committees listed under this paragraph
21 are—

22 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
23 the Senate;

24 (B) the Committee on Energy and Natural
25 Resources of the Senate;

1 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives; and

3 (D) the Committee on Energy and Com-
4 merce of the House of Representatives.

5 (g) RECOVERY OF STOLEN ASSETS.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after
7 a congressional committee listed under paragraph
8 (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
9 of section 502, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
10 of the Treasury, and the Attorney General shall pro-
11 vide such briefing to such committee.

12 (2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The con-
13 gressional committees listed under this paragraph
14 are—

15 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
16 the Senate;

17 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,
18 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

19 (C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
20 Senate;

21 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
22 the House of Representatives;

23 (E) the Committee on Financial Services
24 of the House of Representatives; and

1 (F) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
2 House of Representatives.

3 (h) FINANCIAL SANCTIONS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after
5 a congressional committee listed under paragraph
6 (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
7 of section 605, 606, or 608, the Secretary of the
8 Treasury shall provide such briefing to such com-
9 mittee.

10 (2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The con-
11 gressional committees listed under this paragraph
12 are—

13 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
14 the Senate;

15 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,
16 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

17 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
18 the House of Representatives; and

19 (D) the Committee on Financial Services
20 of the House of Representatives.

21 (i) KINGPIN SANCTIONS.—Not later than 15 days
22 after a congressional committee listed under subsection
23 (h)(2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
24 of section 607, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney
25 General, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the

1 Central Intelligence Agency shall provide such briefing to
2 such committee.

3 (j) PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH ROSNEFT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after
5 a congressional committee listed under paragraph
6 (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation
7 of section 609, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
8 of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Homeland Se-
9 curity shall provide such briefing to such committee.

10 (2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The con-
11 gressional committees listed under this paragraph
12 are—

13 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
14 the Senate;

15 (B) the Committee on Homeland Security
16 and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

17 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
18 the House of Representatives; and

19 (D) the Committee on Homeland Security
20 of the House of Representatives.

21 (k) CRYPTOCURRENCY SANCTIONS.—Not later than
22 15 days after a congressional committee listed under sub-
23 section (h)(2) requests a briefing regarding the implemen-
24 tation of section 701 or 702, the Secretary of State, the
25 Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Com-

1 modify Futures Trading Commission shall provide such
2 briefing to such committee.

3 **SEC. 802. EXTENSION AND TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS**
4 **AGAINST VENEZUELA.**

5 (a) AMENDMENT.—Section 5(e) of the Venezuela De-
6 fense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014
7 (Public Law 113–278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended
8 by striking “December 31, 2019” and inserting “Decem-
9 ber 31, 2025”.

10 (b) TERMINATION.—The requirement to impose sanc-
11 tions under this Act shall terminate on December 31,
12 2025.

○