

116TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# S. 3844

To require a study conducted by the Secretary of State on the future of arms control with the People's Republic of China.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 2020

Mr. MENENDEZ introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To require a study conducted by the Secretary of State on the future of arms control with the People's Republic of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. FINDINGS.**

4 Congress makes the following findings:

5 (1) Since 1964, the People's Republic of China  
6 has been a nuclear weapons state and has developed  
7 strategic and tactical systems capable of threatening  
8 the United States, United States allies and partners,  
9 and United States and alliance assets in the Indo-  
10 Pacific region.

1           (2) The Government of the People’s Republic of  
2           China continues to develop additional nuclear, space,  
3           cyberspace, and other advanced and emerging capa-  
4           bilities with the ability to threaten targets across the  
5           globe.

6           (3) The People’s Republic of China maintains  
7           limited, survivable nuclear forces intended to guar-  
8           antee a damaging retaliatory strike, with its stra-  
9           tegic nuclear forces consisting of approximately 90  
10          nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles  
11          (ICBMs) and 300 nuclear warheads.

12          (4) According to the Department of Defense, in  
13          addition to its ICBM capabilities, the People’s Re-  
14          public of China retains four operational JIN-class  
15          (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub-  
16          marines (SSBNs) with two more under construction,  
17          all of which carry the modern JL-2 submarine-  
18          launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

19          (5) According to the Defense Intelligence Agen-  
20          cy’s (DIA) 2019 China Military Power Report, the  
21          People’s Republic of China’s nuclear delivery sys-  
22          tems continue to undergo a modernization program  
23          that will make its arsenal “more mobile, responsive,  
24          and accurate”.

1           (6) The DIA also reports that the People’s Lib-  
2           eration Army Rocket Forces (PLARF) fields appro-  
3           priately 1,200 short-range missiles and hundreds of  
4           medium-range ballistic missiles that have the ability  
5           to strike Taiwan and other regional targets.

6           (7) In 2007, the Government of the People’s  
7           Republic of China used an anti-satellite missile to  
8           destroy a weather satellite, creating potentially haz-  
9           ardous debris in a heavily used belt of Earth’s orbit.

10          (8) The People’s Liberation Army continues to  
11          develop anti-satellite capabilities, including research  
12          and possible development of directed energy weapons  
13          and satellite jammers.

14          (9) In October 2019, the Government of the  
15          People’s Republic of China exhibited DF-17 mis-  
16          siles, a hypersonic glider with the ability to rapidly  
17          maneuver at high speeds during flight. Hypersonic  
18          guide vehicles create a new threat to critical infra-  
19          structure, including the United States command and  
20          control system.

21          (10) On December 3, 2019, Assistant Secretary  
22          of State for International Security and Nonprolifera-  
23          tion Christopher Ford, in testimony before the Com-  
24          mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, said  
25          President Donald J. Trump “has publicly called for

1 us to engage both Moscow and Beijing in a new  
2 project of trilateral arms control to help effectively  
3 manage strategic competition and build towards a  
4 better, safer, and more prosperous future together”.

5 **SEC. 2. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**  
6 **FINED.**

7 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
8 mittees” means—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and  
10 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the  
12 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-  
13 resentatives.

14 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

15 It is the policy of the United States that an arms  
16 control dialogue with the People’s Republic of China, co-  
17 ordinated with United States allies and shaped by a coher-  
18 ent Indo-Pacific strategy, is in the national security inter-  
19 ests of the United States.

20 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-**  
21 **CHINA ARMS CONTROL.**

22 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-  
23 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination  
24 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appro-  
25 priate congressional committees a report, and a separate

1 classified annex, that examines the approaches and stra-  
2 tegic effects of engaging the People’s Republic of China  
3 on arms control, including—

4           (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-  
5 ernments of the United States and the People’s Re-  
6 public of China, including on nuclear, ballistic, and  
7 cruise missiles, conventional forces, space, and  
8 cyberspace issues, as well as other new strategic do-  
9 mains, which could reduce the likelihood of war,  
10 limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and con-  
11 strain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific;

12           (2) how the United States Government can fos-  
13 ter increased interest on the part of the Government  
14 of the People’s Republic of China in arms control;

15           (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of  
16 the People’s Republic of China that the United  
17 States Government is most concerned about and how  
18 limiting these capabilities may benefit United States  
19 and allied security interests;

20           (4) opportunities for multilateral arms control  
21 in the Indo-Pacific region;

22           (5) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control  
23 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military  
24 escalation between the United States and the Peo-  
25 ple’s Republic of China; and

- 1 (6) opportunities and methods to create stra-
- 2 tegic transparency between the United States and
- 3 the People's Republic of China.

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