Bill Text: CA AB2599 | 2015-2016 | Regular Session | Introduced
Bill Title: Rape: consent.
Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Democrat 1-0)
Status: (Failed) 2016-11-30 - From committee without further action. [AB2599 Detail]
Download: California-2015-AB2599-Introduced.html
BILL NUMBER: AB 2599 INTRODUCED
BILL TEXT
INTRODUCED BY Assembly Member Gipson
FEBRUARY 19, 2016
An act to amend Sections 261 and 262 of the Penal Code, relating
to rape.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 2599, as introduced, Gipson. Rape: consent.
Under existing law, rape is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished under certain circumstances, including, among others,
circumstances in which sexual intercourse is accomplished where the
person was prevented from resisting because of intoxication or where
the person is incapable of resisting because the victim was
unconscious of the nature of the act.
This bill would instead provide that rape is accomplished where
the person was incapable of giving consent because of intoxication or
where the person is incapable of giving consent because the victim
was unconscious of the nature of the act. By changing the definition
of a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local
agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the
state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that
reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this
act for a specified reason.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program: yes.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. Section 261 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
261. (a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) Where a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder or
developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent, and
this is known or reasonably should be known to the person committing
the act. Notwithstanding the existence of a conservatorship pursuant
to the provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Part 1
(commencing with Section 5000) of Division 5 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code), the prosecuting attorney shall prove, as an
element of the crime, that a mental disorder or developmental or
physical disability rendered the alleged victim incapable of giving
consent.
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of
force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the person or another.
(3) Where a person is prevented from resisting
incapable of giving consent by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition
was known, or reasonably should have been known by the accused.
(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the
act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph,
"unconscious of the nature of the act" means incapable of
resisting giving consent because the victim
meets any one of the following conditions:
(A) Was unconscious or asleep.
(B) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act
occurred.
(C) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's fraud
in fact.
(D) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's
fraudulent representation that the sexual penetration served a
professional purpose when it served no professional purpose.
(5) Where a person submits under the belief that the person
committing the act is someone known to the victim other than the
accused, and this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or
concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the
belief.
(6) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by
threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any
other person, and there is a reasonable possibility that the
perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this paragraph,
"threatening to retaliate" means a threat to kidnap or falsely
imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or
death.
(7) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by
threatening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate,
arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a
reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official. As used
in this paragraph, "public official" means a person employed by a
governmental agency who has the authority, as part of that position,
to incarcerate, arrest, or deport another. The perpetrator does not
actually have to be a public official.
(b) As used in this section, "duress" means a direct or implied
threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to
coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an
act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in
an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total
circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her
relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising
the existence of duress.
(c) As used in this section, "menace" means any threat,
declaration, or act which shows an intention to inflict an injury
upon another.
SEC. 2. Section 262 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
262. (a) Rape of a person who is the spouse of the perpetrator is
an act of sexual intercourse accomplished under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of
force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the person or another.
(2) Where a person is prevented from resisting
incapable of giving consent by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition
was known, or reasonably should have been known, by the accused.
(3) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the
act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph,
"unconscious of the nature of the act" means incapable of
resisting giving consent because the victim
meets one of the following conditions:
(A) Was unconscious or asleep.
(B) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act
occurred.
(C) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's fraud
in fact.
(4) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by
threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any
other person, and there is a reasonable possibility that the
perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this paragraph,
"threatening to retaliate" means a threat to kidnap or falsely
imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or
death.
(5) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by
threatening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate,
arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a
reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official. As used
in this paragraph, "public official" means a person employed by a
governmental agency who has the authority, as part of that position,
to incarcerate, arrest, or deport another. The perpetrator does not
actually have to be a public official.
(b) As used in this section, "duress" means a direct or implied
threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to
coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an
act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in
an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total
circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her
relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in apprising
the existence of duress.
(c) As used in this section, "menace" means any threat,
declaration, or act that shows an intention to inflict an injury upon
another.
(d) If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of this
section, the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine,
one or both of the following requirements:
(1) That the defendant make payments to a battered women's
shelter, up to a maximum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(2) That the defendant reimburse the victim for reasonable costs
of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are
the direct result of the defendant's offense.
For any order to pay a fine, make payments to a battered women's
shelter, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this
subdivision, the court shall make a determination of the defendant's
ability to pay. In no event shall any order to make payments to a
battered women's shelter be made if it would impair the ability of
the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or
court-ordered child support. Where the injury to a married person is
caused in whole or in part by the criminal acts of his or her spouse
in violation of this section, the community property may not be used
to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to
the injured spouse, required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or
before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs
with regard to the injured spouse and dependents, required by this
section, until all separate property of the offending spouse is
exhausted.
SEC. 3. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to
Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because
the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school
district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or
infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty
for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the
Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the
meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
Constitution.
